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THE  TORT  FOUNDATION  OF  DUTY  OF  CARE
AND  BUSINESS  JUDGMENT
Robert J. Rhee*
This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law—the belief that
principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty.  A
board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment
rule precludes it.  Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it.  The con-
ventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails.  This dismissal of tort
principles is wrong.  Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort
cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a com-
mon analytical framework.  The principles of board liability are rooted in tort
doctrines governing duty, customs, and pure economic loss.  Properly
applied, they produce a duty “to care” (vis-a`-vis duty of care), based on good
faith undertaking of care, but upon such undertaking no liability for negli-
gently inflicted economic loss—the exact result achieved by the fiduciary duty
of care and the business judgment rule.  A sound tort analysis not only theo-
rizes the enigmatic relationship between the duty of care and the business
judgment rule, but it also explain Delaware’s puzzling procedural-substan-
tive divide.  Fiduciary duty in corporation law rests on a tort foundation.
Lastly, the thesis of this Article has a broader implication.  The contractarian
view of corporation law seeks to relegate the role of courts to passive custodi-
ans of the corporate contractual terms provided by the legislature and the
corporation’s constituents.  However, this view is constrained by a tort frame-
work wherein courts do and should play a robust, albeit reserved, role in
regulating important aspects of corporate governance through continued
common law process of doctrinal development of the idea of a wrong.
 2013 Robert J. Rhee.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
The structure of corporation law is built on two grand rules limit-
ing the liability of participants in the corporate enterprise.  The first is
the rule of limited liability of shareholders.1  The second is the rule
limiting the liability of directors under the business judgment rule.
Jointly these rules promote enterprise by allowing shareholders and
directors to take risks without fear of catastrophic personal liability.
Without them there would be no corporation as we know it.  While
the theory of shareholder limited liability is well understood today,2
we still lack a consensus on the theory of the relationship between the
duty of care and the business judgment rule.3  The academic litera-
ture has instead focused on instrumental policy grounds to justify the
consensus view that the business judgment rule generally produces
correct outcomes.  This is a curious state of academic affairs given the
importance of the issue.  The theoretical deficit has not been for want
of scholarship, which has been voluminous.4
1 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 126–51 (2002);
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 7–9 (1986); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 40–41 (1991).
2 Although there is not a complete consensus, there are sharply defined posi-
tions. Compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 41–47 (advancing a theory R
that limited liability is efficient), with Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (advancing a
theory that limited liability is inefficient).
3 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 242 (“[T]he lack of a coherent and unified R
theory explain[s] why the rule exists.”); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business
Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 573 (“[W]e remain short of any broad consensus
. . . .”); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L.
REV. 259, 270 (1967) (noting that the business judgment rule is “one of the least
understood concepts in the entire corporate field”).
4 A sampling of works includes William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287
(2001) [hereinafter Allen et al., Function Over Form]; William T. Allen et al., Realigning
the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van
Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002)
[hereinafter Allen et al., Realigning]; S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revis-
ited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule
as Ahstention [sic] Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1735, 1789–99 (2001); Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment
Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 BUS. LAW. 469 (1990); Stuart R.
Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions
Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 437 (1993); Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule,
and The American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355 (1993);
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The duty of care and the business judgment rule are bound
together in an enigma.5  The mystery deepens when the tort analogy
is applied.  A director’s duty of care is frequently analogized to the
duty of care in tort law, which is the language of culpability seen in
accident law.6  “Yet, the one thing about the business judgment rule
on which everyone agrees is that it insulates directors from liability for
negligence.”7  Tort law finds liability; corporation law excuses it.  The
apparent failure of the tort analogy—the schizophrenic invocation
and rejection of negligence—is jarring.  Although most people agree
that, generally speaking, board liability should be limited, this broad
policy is intrinsically unhelpful in conceptualizing the liability bound-
ary.  The duty of care and the business judgment rule are not only
important to corporation law inter se, but also corporation law influ-
ences the laws of other business organizations, 8 including the use of
the business judgment rule.9  Thus, the inquiry here has broad impli-
cation in the entire field of business organizations.
Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Johnson, Modest]; Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 787 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, Rethinking]; Kenneth E. Scott, Cor-
poration Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV.
927 (1983); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675 (2002); E.
Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act,
the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project—A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1483,
1486 (1985).
5 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSI-
NESS ORGANIZATION 256 (2d ed. 2007) (describing the business judgment rule as a
“mystery”); Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 1789 (describing the lack of a theory as “one R
of the most persistent and puzzling problems in corporate law”).
6 As of 2005, forty jurisdictions required that directors discharge their duties
under a standard of care usually phrased in terms of the ordinarily prudent person
under similar circumstances. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 243 n.7; see MODEL BUS. R
CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2011) (“[T]he care that a person in a like position would rea-
sonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a)
(1994) (“[T]he care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected
to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.”).
7 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 243; see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. R
1982) (“While it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable for
negligence in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a state-
ment is misleading.”).
8 The laws of limited liability companies adopt many aspects of corporate law,
including provisions for exculpation, indemnification, insurance, derivative lawsuits,
and special litigation committees. See REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
ACT §§ 110(d), 408, 902, 905 (2006).
9 See id. § 409(c); IDAHO UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 30-6-409(3).
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This Article provides a theory of the duty of care and the business
judgment rule through the prism of tort theory and principles.10  To
be clear, I do not argue that a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort,11 just
the way it is not a breach of contract, notwithstanding the con-
tractarian view of corporate governance.  The thesis here is that the
liability scheme of corporate boards under the doctrines of fiduciary
duty and the business judgment rule can be understood through the
analytics of torts.12  Although corporate law scholars have been wary of
inter-doctrinal analysis of corporation law,13 tort principles are
embedded in important doctrines of corporation law.14  In the arena
of board liability for wrongful conduct, an inter-doctrinal analysis is
inevitable.15  When corporation law states that a director should act as
an “ordinarily careful and prudent” person16 and a breach of the duty
of care is defined as “gross negligence,”17 it borrows from the lexicon
of torts and scholarship should squarely address, and not casually dis-
miss, this tension.
This Article answers the question: If there was no corporation law of
fiduciary duty of care and tort law applied instead, what would the legal frame-
work of a director’s duty and standard of liability look like?18  Few scholars
10 This Article concerns the duty of care.  Outside of the good faith jurisprudence
of the duty of loyalty, see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), the traditional duty
of loyalty is fairly uncontroversial as to basic principles.
11 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling
Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1327 (2011) (“As a conceptual matter, it is also
pretty clear that breaches of fiduciary duties are not torts, at least not in the common
law use of that term, although they may be ‘civil wrongs.’”).
12 Common law jurisdictions outside of the United States have recognized that
tort law provides an analytical foundation for a director’s duty of care. See John H.
Farrar, Directors’ Duties of Care, 23 SINGAPORE ACAD. L.J. 745, 747–50, 752–54 (2011).
13 See Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1417, 1441
(2010) (noting that “corporate law scholarship has eschewed an extradoctrinal analy-
sis”); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law,
and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 651–52 (2002) (arguing
that transplanting the law of trusts and agency into corporate law created “mischief”).
14 See infra Part IV.A.
15 Cf. Rhee, supra note 13, at 1441–42 (criticizing the aversion to interdoctrinal R
analysis in corporate law).  Some scholars have recognized the intersection of tort and
corporation laws. See Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
for Supervision and Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort Law, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 1661, 1665 (2010) (proposing a tort-based approach for imposing
liability on officers and directors in cases of fraud and intentional misconduct).
16 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
17 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
18 This question is not just a theoretical exercise.  In presiding over Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), a case brought by the receiver against a director
for the collapse of a corporation due to the director’s neglect and inattention, Judge
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have engaged in this analysis,19 presumably because most have
assumed that the application of tort law to corporate decisions would
expand board liability under the general negligence standard to
untenable levels.  This conventional wisdom is wrong.  Tort theory
provides not just the lexicon of liability, but the foundational princi-
ples of the duty and liability of corporate boards.
Under a correct account of the tort analogy, the duty of care and
the business judgment rule are not antipodes of a paradox, but are
complementary principles governing duty and its scope.  Two princi-
ples play key roles.  First, an affirmative undertaking to manage the
affairs of the corporation20 not only begets a fiduciary duty of care,
but it limits the scope of that duty.  Under the tort doctrine of indus-
try customs, the scope of a director’s duty of care reflects the implied
standard of care that would be adopted by market participants.  A tort-
based proposition is consistent with the prevailing contractarian the-
ory of corporation law, and it shows that the negligence standard
would not apply to the substance of business decisions.  Second, theo-
ries of pure economic loss provide the foundation principles for the
rule that a director’s duty of care does not encompass negligently
inflicted economic loss.  Microeconomic analysis has shown that mis-
takes in market transactions often result in no social cost, thus justify-
ing a rule of no liability.21  At a broader political economic level, the
precondition of a market economy, one based on profit and risk tak-
ing, is uncertainty and imperfect information.  This broader analysis
has shown that courts refrain from interfering with market outcomes
through the rule of no duty.22  These limitations of duty under tort
law explain the principles of the duty of care and the business judg-
ment rule.
This Article argues that the board’s duty of care is a mischievous
misnomer of preposition.  This lexicon invokes the general negli-
Learned Hand framed the issue of director liability this way: “This cause of action
rests upon a tort, as much though it be a tort of omission as though it had rested
upon a positive act.” Id. at 616.
19 Cf. Robert B. Thompson, Federal Corporate Law: Torts and Fiduciary Duty, 31 J.
CORP. L. 877, 891 (2006) (arguing that federal securities laws regulating corporate
governance are based on a tort foundation).
20 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2011).
21 See, e.g., W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1982)
(“[M]any financial losses may not be losses at all in an economic sense, that is from
the point of view of net social welfare.”).
22 See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, A Production Theory of Pure Economic Loss, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 49, 90 (2010) (“The pure economic loss rule is a market abstention doctrine.
Courts do not interfere with market outcomes by redistributing wealth upon adverse
outcome causally traced to a specific form of business risk.”).
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gence principle requiring an examination of the substance of the
action when in fact tort law does not extend the scope of duty and
liability that far.  Tort theory limits the scope of a board’s legal obliga-
tion to a duty to care for the corporation, which embodies the duty of
good faith intention evinced by effort toward the care and custody of
the corporation and the exercise of authority vested in a board whose
members affirmatively assume the mantle of directorship.23  The duty
of care imposes an affirmative duty, and the business judgment rule
defines the scope of that duty implied in the customary terms of a
voluntary undertaking.
This Article theorizes the enigmatic relationship between the
duty of care and the business judgment rule.  The principles of torts
can and do play a robust part in regulating important aspects of the
internal affairs of the corporation.  In the tort framework, there are
several narrow theories under which directors can be held accounta-
ble: (1) indifference to caring evinced by a failure to monitor or man-
age the affairs of the corporation or an abdication of the mantle of
responsibility;24 (2) insufficient effort to care for the corporation
evinced by substantial procedural defects in decision-making;25 and
(3) bad faith evinced by a knowing dereliction of duty.26  These theo-
ries of board liability are well recognized, and the common thread is a
breach of a director’s affirmative duty to undertake care of the corpo-
ration.  A corrected tort analogy provides theoretical coherence to the
liability scheme.  It explains corporation law’s focus on demonstrable
acts of care evincing good faith and benign intentions of a custodian
as opposed to an examination of the substantive actions causing eco-
23 Indeed, the recent proliferation of scholarship on good faith is consistent with
the view. See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight,
55 UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A
Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005); Hillary A. Sale,
Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et
al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J.
629 (2010).
24 See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364–65 (Del. 2006); Francis v. United
Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(iv)
(2011); see also Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Del. 1996) (ruling that an
abdication of duty may be the basis of a direct claims by shareholders), overruled on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
25 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B) (2011).
26 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64, 66–67 (Del. 2006);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(i) (2011).
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nomic loss, and Delaware’s puzzling substantive-procedural divide
wherein duty of care is limited to procedural aspects of decision-
making.
Lastly, this Article shows that there is a distinct space in corporate
law for a tort-based theory of fiduciary duty, the obligation of good
faith, and the liability of directors. The contractarian view of corpo-
rate law emphasizes the privateness of contracts, and it diminishes the
role and power of courts in the realm of corporate governance and
board liability. In contrast, the tort framework of fiduciary duty justi-
fies a robust, albeit reserved, role of courts in regulating corporate
governance through the common law development of law. When
courts refrain from unreasonably interfering in corporate governance,
they are expressing an important normative value of the relationship
between private decisionmaking and public review.
This Article is written in four parts.  Part I frames the issues by
summarizing the duty of care and the business judgment rule, and
then explaining the apparent failure of the “tort analogy.”  Part II
shows the tort foundation of the duty of care and the business judg-
ment.  When principles of duty, industry customs, and pure economic
loss are properly applied, a board has a duty of care arising from its
affirmative undertaking of managerial power, but the scope of duty is
limited by the customary understanding under a contract analysis.
Part III develops a broader economic perspective.  The doctrine and
theory of pure economic loss in tort law explain why a board has no
negligence-based duty to prevent a corporation’s economic loss.  Part
IV discusses the larger implications of the tort foundation of duty and
business judgment.  It argues that courts do and should play a robust
and authoritative role, albeit reserved, in regulating important aspects
of the internal affairs of the corporation through continued doctrinal
development of the idea of a wrong.
I. DUTY, BUSINESS JUDGMENT, AND THE TORT ANALOGY
A. Fiduciary Duty and Business Judgment
The duty of care has been a feature of organizational law since
the precursors of the modern corporation.27  Analogous to a common
obligation under tort law, “directors of a corporation in managing the
corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which ordina-
27 See Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch. 1742) (holding that
“[b]y accepting of a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to execute it with fidelity and
reasonable diligence; and it is no excuse to say that they had no benefit from it”); see
also Marcia M. McMurray, Note, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of
Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606–13 (1987).
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rily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”28
Failure to conform to this standard implies the real possibility of liabil-
ity for negligence, though findings of culpability are in fact infrequent
(and impositions of personal liability even rarer29).
The textbook case on the duty of care is the most famous corpo-
rate law case of all: Smith v. Van Gorkom.30  There, the board of the
target company engaged in a flawed process when it approved a
merger agreement within a constrained time period without adequate
evaluation of the merger consideration, without reading the merger
agreement, and without adequate understanding of the negotiation
between the chief executive officer and the acquirer that resulted in
the proposal for a takeover.31  The court ruled that the appropriate
standard of review was gross negligence.32  It held that the board’s
flawed procedure met this standard.  This was the first time that the
Delaware Supreme Court found a set of facts constituting a breach of
the duty of care in connection with the exercise of a business judg-
ment,33 prompting shocked reactions from the corporate bar and
legal scholars.34
Several years after Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court
again ruled in favor of liability for a breach of the duty of care in Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.35  The facts were similar to those in Van
Gorkom: the board was minimally informed; the transaction was driven
almost exclusively by Technicolor’s CEO; and the board rubber-
stamped the process.36  The chancery court, per Chancellor William
Allen, expressed “grave doubts” that the board satisfied the Van
28 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2011).
29 Among other things, the articles of incorporation may include exculpation,
indemnification, and insurance provisions, which collectively shield a director’s per-
sonal liability. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 145(a), 145(g).
30 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d.
31 Id. at 875.
32 Id. at 873.
33 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 258; Rock & Wachter, supra note 13, at 651; see R
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) (noting “a search for a
very small number of needles in a very large haystack”).
34 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment,
Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127 (1988); Rock & Wachter, supra note 13, at R
651.
35 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
36 Id. at 352–57.
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Gorkom standard.37  The supreme court deferred to the trial court’s
finding of “pervasive and persuasive evidence” of a violation of the
duty of care,38 and ruled that in the face of a finding of a breach of
duty of care the trial court must apply the entire fairness review to the
transaction where the burden is on the defendant to prove fair deal-
ing and fair price.39  With respect to the business judgment rule, the
court opined that the rule “operates to preclude a court from impos-
ing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.”40
In both Van Gorkom and Cede, the business judgment rule did not
protect the board because there was a finding that the board
breached its duty of care.  The breach of duty arose from substantial
procedural defects.  In Delaware, the duty of care is limited by a sub-
stantive-procedural dichotomy, which was made explicit in Brehm v.
Eisner41:
As for the plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to
exercise “substantive due care,” we should note that such a concept
is foreign to the business judgment rule.  Courts do not measure,
weigh or quantify directors’ judgments.  We do not even decide if
they are reasonable in this context.  Due care in the decisionmaking
context is process due care only.42
Thus, the scope of the duty of care is limited to the process of deci-
sion-making, and not the substantive quality of the business
decision.43
The duty of care and the business judgment rule are closely
related.44  Like the duty of care, the business judgment rule traces its
37 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 551, 560 (1992), availa-
ble at 1991 WL 111134 (Del. Ch. June 24, 1991), rev’d Cede, 634 A.2d.
38 Cede, 634 A.2d at 350, 358, 373.
39 Id. at 361; see McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000) (reaffirm-
ing the Cede framework).
40 Cede, 634 A.2d at 360 (emphasis added).
41 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
42 Id. at 264.  A line of Delaware cases have stated that a court should not substi-
tute its judgment for the board’s on substantive business decisions. See Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
43 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 92; Hansen, supra note 4, at 1356; Stout, supra R
note 4, at 675; Veasey & Seitz, supra note 4, at 1486. R
44 See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 88 (stating the business judgment rule is “inti- R
mately associated” with the duty of care); Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process
and the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 97 (1989) (noting
that the business judgment rule is a “corollary” to the duty of care).
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roots back to the rise of the early corporations.45  It is a judge-made
rule developed through the common law process,46 and it is based on
the judicial recognition of the board’s statutory authority to manage a
corporation.47  A modern formulation of the business judgment rule,
as articulated in Aronson v. Lewis,48 provides that the rule “is a pre-
sumption that in making a business decision the directors . . . acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”49
The business judgment rule is applied if these conditions are sat-
isfied: (1) a decision was made upon an informed decision-making
process; and (2) it was made in good faith and not tainted by self-
interest.50  The first condition addresses whether the board satisfied
the duty of care, and the second condition addresses the duty of loy-
alty.51  Unless a plaintiff can show a breach of fiduciary duty, the busi-
ness judgment rule shields directors from judicial scrutiny of the
substantive decision, even if it is patently wrong.
45 See Godbold v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847); Bodell v. Gen-
eral Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 268 (Del. 1927); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.)
68, 77–78 (La. 1829); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 724 (N.Y. 1912); see
also McMurray, supra note 27, at 613 (“The business judgment rule developed concur- R
rently with the duty of care.”).
46 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Douglas M. Bran-
son, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 633
(2002).
47 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003); Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
48 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
49 Id. at 812.
50 Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 441.  These conditions boil down to two essential R
questions.  “First, did the Board reach its decision in the good faith pursuit of a legiti-
mate corporate interest?  Second, did the Board do so advisedly?”  Gantler v. Ste-
phens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009).
51 The business judgment rule does not apply when there has been no exercise of
judgment resulting in a decision. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d
693, 748 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (en banc); Gimbel v. Signal
Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974).  Intentional omissions, being decisions, are
protected. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813.  But neglectful inaction is not protected. See,
e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).  Another caveat is that
the decision must meet a minimum standard of rationality. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049,
1051–52 (Del. Ch. 1996).  Irrationality is “the outer limit of the business judgment
rule” and “the functional equivalent of the waste test.”  Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
264 (Del. 2000).  Waste occurs “only in the rare, ‘unconscionable case’” where a
board irrationally squanders corporate assets. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006).  As such, the exception has been described as “theoreti-
cal.” Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1051–52.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 11  8-MAR-13 16:03
2013] duty  of  care  and  business  judgment 1149
A well-known example of the business judgment rule at work is
Kamin v. American Express Co.52  There, American Express had bought
a stake in an investment bank, which subsequently declined in value.
The board decided to divest, and it had two choices: sell the stake, or
distribute the asset to shareholders through a special in-kind divi-
dend.  A sale would have resulted in recognizing a $25 million loss on
the income statement, which would have yielded about $8 million of
tax savings due to the reduction in taxable income.  A distribution of
shares would have avoided the loss recognition, but would have for-
feited the tax advantage.  The choice was between increasing account-
ing profit at the cost of reducing true economic value, and increasing
economic value by recognizing an incurred loss under accounting
rules.  This is no choice at all.  Since firm value is the sum of the pre-
sent value of the firm’s free cash flow,53 a sale that would have
reduced the accounting profit was the correct choice as a matter of
finance theory.
The board made the wrong decision and issued the special divi-
dend, though the decision-making process was informed as a matter
of procedure.  The board considered both options, but believed that a
reduction in reported income would lower share price.  This explana-
tion is not as irrational as a coin flip, but it has no basis in generally
accepted, widely known theory of valuation.  Share price is not the
same as intrinsic value.54  Share price boosted by accounting profit
alone does not increase the value of the firm, as evinced by the col-
lapse of Enron.  With a well-functioning capital market, the decline is
the asset value would have already been incorporated into American
Express’s share price.55  The board’s choice was to take $8 million
of cash on the table or nothing at all.  Its decision to take nothing
was indefensible error.56  One would be hard pressed to find an
52 Kamin v. American Express Co, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1976), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d
993 (App. Div. 1976).
53 RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 90–93 (10th ed.
2011).
54 Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 532 (1986).
55 The Kamin court understood this point well when it noted that the dispute
concerned “the best way to handle a loss already incurred on an investment.” Kamin,
383 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
56 Although the decision was clearly wrong, the board’s action may not have been
irrational from the perspective of a self-interested agent.  It can be explained by
improper but unprovable motives such as a vain attempt to support short-term stock
prices for the purpose of executive compensation, or obfuscating the nature of a
failed investment which would have been made clearer with the recognition of a loss.
Thus, Kamin can be seen as an unprovable duty of loyalty case that had to be brought
as a duty of care case.
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economist or a law professor who would defend the decision in
Kamin.57
In spite of the demonstrably wrong decision, the court properly
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint per the application of the business
judgment rule.58  Since the board was reasonably informed and
engaged in a proper process, care was given; the board’s mistake
“presents no basis for the superimposition of judicial judgment, so
long as it appears that the directors have been acting in good faith.”59
Once applied, the business judgment rule precludes a substantive
review of a board’s action, irrespective of the correctness or the intelli-
gence of a decision.  The business judgment rule is striking in that not
only does it protect risky decisions, but as courts and scholars cheer-
fully (and correctly) tell us it also protects foolish, awful, and egre-
gious decisions,60 whereas tort law would never countenance the
stupid person defense.61
57 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 98 (“[I]t seems indisputable that Ameri- R
can Express’ board made the wrong decision.”).
58 “Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon cor-
porate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose
liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labelled [sic] the bus-
iness judgment rule.”  Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
59 Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 812; accord Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 582
(Del. Ch. 2000) (“The business judgment rule shields directors form liability for good
faith business decisions, even those that turn out to be mistaken.”).
60 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996) (“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a
decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to
‘egregious’ or ‘irrational,’ provides no ground for director liability, so long as the
court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a good
faith effort to advance corporate interests.”); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d
1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“If, however, corporate directors were to be found liable
for a corporate loss from a risky project on the ground that the investment was too
risky (foolishly risky!  stupidly risky!  egregiously risky!—you supply the adverb), their
liability would be joint and several for the whole loss . . . .”); ALLEN ET AL., supra note
5, at 255 (“[D]isinterested directors who act deliberately and in good faith should R
never be liable for a resulting loss, no matter how stupid their decisions may seem ex
post.”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 98 (“Occasionally the decision will R
be a howler, making inquiry easy.”); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619,
1672 (2001) (suggesting that directors will not be liable for “pretty dumb” decisions);
Stout, supra note 4, at 676 (“[I]t shields directors who follow the requisite procedures R
from liability even when they make reckless, foolish, and downright stupid deci-
sions.”); Veasey & Seitz, supra note 4, at 1486 (noting “[i]n cases other than those R
involving contests for control or termination of derivatives suits,” courts are unlikely
to impose liability on decisions “no matter how ill-advised, stupid, or questionable”).
61 The stupid-person defense has long been rejected in common law. See, e.g.,
Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (1837) (rejecting the defense in a negli-
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B. Critique of Two Rationales for the Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule has been justified on many policy
grounds.  As I show in Parts II and III, infra, several of these rationales
are sound instrumental reasons that justify the rule, and I further
show that these reasons are the policy percolations of a theory based
on a tort foundation.  For completeness of analysis, two frequently
cited and widely supported rationales are discussed below.  I conclude
that these two rationales are problematic on their own terms.
One argument for the business judgment rule is the claim that
courts are incompetent to review business decisions.  Courts and com-
mentators have suggested that the complexity of business is beyond
the intellectual reach of courts.62  Construed strictly, this argument is
at best not a serious thought, and at worst a disingenuous assertion.  It
elevates the business profession to some rarefied level of incompre-
hensibility, and as such courts could not presume to venture a review
of board decisions.63  The truth is that many business decisions are
subject to rational judicial assessment.  One need not be an officer or
director to understand that the world is uncertain, profit is not guar-
anteed, and risks must be taken.  Even a child knows the risks of run-
gence action that the defendant “ought not to be responsible for the misfortune of
not possessing the highest order of intelligence”).
62 See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“[W]e
do not mean to say that we have decided that the decision of the directors was a
correct one.  That is beyond our jurisdiction and ability.”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“The judges are not business experts.”); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (“[C]ourts are ill equipped and infre-
quently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments.”);
see also Dennis J. Block et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litiga-
tion at the Turn of the Decade, 45 BUS. LAW. 469, 490 (1990) (“[Courts] are admittedly
ill-equipped to handle [complex corporate decision-making].”); Robert J. Haft, Busi-
ness Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1,
15 (1981) (“[J]udges and juries [ ] lack competence to evaluate complex business
decisions . . . .”); Veasey & Seitz, supra note 4, at 1485 (“[A] court is ill-equipped to R
make business decisions . . . .”).
63 Most CEOs of major public companies do not have graduate degrees, and
some lack even undergraduate degrees. See Menachem Wecker, Where the Fortune 500
CEOs Went to College (May 14, 2012), available at http://www.usnews.com/education/
best-graduate-schools/top-business-schools/articles/2012/05/14/where-the-fortune-
500-ceos-went-to-school (“[T]he Fortune 500 executives who completed both college
and graduate school collectively earned about 200 MBAs and about 140 other gradu-
ate degrees.”).  Nearly 160 CEOs in the Fortune 500 companies have no graduate
degree, and 35 have no college degree. Id.  The suggestion here is not that one needs
a graduate degree to run public companies, or that running a public company is easy,
but that glorification of people and positions and exaggeration of complexity are
unwarranted.
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ning a lemonade stand.  In fact, courts routinely review business
decisions under the entire fairness standard upon a plaintiff’s rebuttal
of the business judgment rule, at which point the court engages in a
substantive review of the business decision and must be satisfied of its
fairness.64
If courts are competent to understand the economics of antitrust,
the etiology of diseases, the economic effects of healthcare legislation,
or complex business decisionmaking in the context of assigning tort
liability, they are capable of understanding and passing judgment on
business decisions, complexity notwithstanding.65  If courts need help,
expert witnesses in all aspects of business management are plentiful.
All of the epistemological and psychological problems associated with
discovering the truth of a past occurrence are no more difficult in
corporation law than in other fields of law.  Despite frequent asser-
tions, scholars have been rightfully skeptical of the argument that
courts lack the technical competence to review business decisions.66
Another frequently cited rationale for the business judgment rule
is the explanation that the standard of conduct and the standard of
review diverge in corporation law.67  The standard of conduct
expressed in the duty of care is an aspirational norm providing boards
guidance on how they should manage the corporation,68 whereas the
64 “Under the entire fairness standard of judicial review, the defendant directors
must establish to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both
fair dealing and fair price.”  Cede & Co. v. Techicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.
1993); see Allen et al., Realigning, supra note 4, at 461 (noting that substantive review R
under the entire fairness standard is proper in loyalty violation).  Commentators have
suggested that, in truth, courts do review the substance of business decisions. See
Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 91; Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 442; William T. Quillen, R
Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 492
(1985); David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP.
L. 301, 301–302 (2007) (“It is a truth almost universally acknowledged that courts will
not review the substance of the business decisions of corporate directors except under
extraordinary circumstances.”).
65 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 254 (“Reviewing a baseball team’s board of R
directors’ refusal to play games at night, for example, seems no more technically
demanding than reviewing medical or product design decisions.”).
66 See id. at 257 (noting that the technical complexity of tort problems may be
equivalent to that of business decisions); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 94 R
(“The business judgment rule must rest on something more [than judicial incompe-
tence].”); R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment
Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1341–42 (1993) (same).
67 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 437. R
68 Id. at 437, 464.  However, this scheme is not meaningless, it is argued, because
it still influences behavior. Id. at 464; see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 257 R
(“[A]rticulating the standard of care has the pedagogic function of informing them
just what ‘doing the right thing’ means under the circumstances.”).
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standard of review expressed in the business judgment rule is the legal
rule providing courts the legal standard to assess liability.69  In other
fields of law such as tort law, the standards of conduct and review con-
flate to a single standard for the purpose of judicial review.70  In cor-
poration law, the two standards are said to diverge due to the
“institutional nature of the corporation.”71  Directors frequently make
decisions with incomplete information, and “on the basis of bounded
rationality.”72  Merging the standard of conduct with the standard of
review, it is said, would impose greater cost.73  Thus, the explanation
of divergent standards answers Robert Clark’s question—“Is the duty
of care simply gobbledygook, then, or a mere exhortation rather than
an enforceable legal duty?”74—with a resounding “yes.”  This idea has
been influential and endorsed by prominent scholars and judges.75  It
has been incorporated into the Model Business Corporation Act.76
Despite its prominence and the acceptance of the theory by
prominent portions of the academic community, the idea of divergent
standards is puzzling from the standpoint of explaining the role of
courts and the concept of liability for wrongs.77  No one can deny that
the fundamental role of courts is to apply rules of law, determine
wrongs, and assign liability.  Yet, the theory of divergent standards says
that courts are ultimately cheerleaders for the aspiration of “best prac-
tices.”  Given that many academics, think tanks, business roundtables,
69 Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 462. R
70 Id. at 437, 463.
71 Id. at 464.
72 Id. at 466.
73 Id. at 467–68.
74 CLARK, supra note 1, at 124. R
75 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 257 (noting that “there is social value to R
announcing a standard (‘you must act as a reasonable person would act’) that is not
enforced with a liability rule”); Allen et al., Function Over Form, supra note 4, at R
1295–96; Allen et al., Realigning, supra note 4, at 450. R
76 Section 8.30, titled “Standards of Conduct for Directors,” provides that when
discharging the duties of a director, she shall act in a manner she reasonably believes
to be in the best interest of the corporation and discharge oversight duties with the
care that a person would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.
See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)–(b) (2011).  But Section 8.31, titled “Standards
of Liability for Directors,” provides that absent a showing of bad faith, derogation of
duty, or unreasonable belief, there shall be no liability “for any decision to take or not
to take action, or any failure to take any action.”  Id. § 8.31(a).  The comments to the
MBCA make clear that this approach relies on Eisenberg’s thesis of the divergence
between the standard of conduct and the standard of review. Id. official cmt.
77 See D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate Director Standards from the Model
Business Corporation Act, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1999) (critiquing the divergent
standards explanation).
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and pundits contribute to this enterprise, it is unclear what additional
value is to be gained from the elocution of courts through essentially
advisory opinions.  The ultimate source of the expressive value of judi-
cial opinions is derived solely from the power to assess liability (i.e., a
consultant in a black robe is still just a consultant).  In other fields of
law in which disputes are adjudicated with the outcome at stake,
courts are special precisely because they can prescribe and enforce
laws.  This is not to say that, generally speaking, norms are unimpor-
tant to corporate governance,78 and courts may even have a role in
opining per dicta and appropriate tangents on the ideals of corporate
governance and business management,79 but the term “fiduciary duty”
has special legal meaning, which is a legally binding obligation.  The
determination of liability for breach of duty is a legal question.80  The
exhortation that directors ought to act reasonably is unhelpful, not
because it is wrong, but because it is trite.  How else should directors
behave?  Do they really need judges to remind them that they ought
to behave reasonably under the circumstances?  If the average motor-
ist of ordinary intelligence, even without the benefit of legal advice,
knows that she must act reasonably on the road, one suspects that the
average director, typically a highly accomplished and high standing
member of our society, would know society’s expectation as well.  The
dichotomy of standards essentially says that a director’s “fiduciary
duty” is not a legal obligation backed by the force of law.  It trivializes
the role of courts and laws, and thus attempts to justify academically
their excision from decisional matters of corporate governance.
Liability for a wrong should ultimately matter, a point amply
demonstrated by the shocked reaction to the finding of liability in
Smith v. Van Gorkom.81  A mountain of papers on aspiration does not
hold a candle to a single-page order of judgment.  Directors do not
need aspirational sermons on the boardroom mount,82 when we con-
sider that it comes with the price tag of Wall Street investment banks
and law firms who must divine what the sermons actually mean, a sig-
78 Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253 (1999) (describing the operation of social norms—behavior, practices, and obli-
gation—in motivating adherence to corporate law); Rock & Wachter, supra note 60, R
at 1640–53.
79 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 56 (Del. 2006) (opining
on the “best practices” of corporate executive compensation process).
80 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
81 See supra note 34 (describing the criticism). R
82 But see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (arguing that judicial opinions “can best
be thought of as ‘corporate law sermons’” and that judges are “preachers”).
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nificant cost attached to every meaningful transaction.  Directors are
typically highly accomplished, ambitious, sophisticated, and well
advised; they know full well that they ought to act reasonably without
reminder from the pages of state law reporters as interpreted by
expensive legal advisers; they also know that liability, not aspirational
norm, ultimately determines the legality of their decision.  It is not
clear why directors need a special legal framework, requiring expert
reading of the tea leaves of Delaware jurisprudence, merely to inform
them—in the most convoluted way that corporation law is expressed
no less—that in essence they ought to act reasonably under the cir-
cumstances.  I do not deny that a reminder of their duties in the boar-
droom may have tangible salutary value, but there is unquestionably a
cost-benefit consideration attached to the provision of legal and finan-
cial opinions when the preaching of aspirational norms are made to
be a necessary transaction cost.83  If we are left only with an aspira-
tional norm, the whole thing strikes of kabuki theater. This indul-
gence of judicial ceremony comes at the heavy cost of legal
uncertainty and its progeny of derivative suits.84  And, if the duty of
care is simply an aspirational norm, one wonders whether the psycho-
logical effect of having a friendly reminder of the aspiration is really
worth it, or whether the Sunday boardroom can do without the
sermons.
The explanation of divergent standards is a strained and ulti-
mately unconvincing justification for the narrow scope of the duty of
care and the excision of courts from the substantive decisionmaking
in corporate governance.  These ends may well be justified as a matter
of policy and theory, and in this respect the explanation of divergent
standards serves the limited function of placing descriptive tags for
the outcomes that the rules of law correctly achieve in most cases.
However, the explanation raises the question without really answering
it: Why does the duty of care beget an obligation while the business
judgment rule seems to deny it?  The answer—exceptionalism of cor-
porate law—is not very satisfying or convincing.  The divergence of
the standards of conduct and review is not seen in most other areas
such as torts, criminal law, environmental law, etc., all of which involve
83 See generally Steven J. Cleveland, An Economic and Behavioral Analysis of Invest-
ment Bankers When Delivering Fairness Opinions, 58 ALA. L. REV. 299 (2006) (providing a
critique of the utility of fairness opinions); Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 1557 (2006) (same).
84 See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Con-
tinuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that Delaware law has become
complex and uncertain resulting in increased litigation).
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assessing individual decisions of great significance.85  And, the core
disjunction in the concept of board liability persists: the excusal of
errors and bad judgments is something we do not see in other areas of
law.  As theory goes, the explanation creates a convenient illusion of
plausibility supporting the consensus intuition that the systematic lia-
bility outcomes seen in corporation law are correct.
C. The Flawed Tort Analogy
The relationship between corporation law and tort law has been
distant.  Commentators have argued that tort law and corporation law
are different because the goal of torts is loss spreading, whereas corpo-
ration law seeks to incentivize risk taking.86  The tort system, it is
argued, shifts loss from specific victims to a larger pool of risk-bearers
through insurance and tort liability.87  In the corporate setting, such
robust liability scheme would concentrate risk by shifting loss from
diversified shareholders to directors.  These points are well taken, but
they are incomplete.  It is undercut by the existence of a substantial
Directors & Officers insurance market.  Furthermore, the argument is
based on an incomplete conception of the tort system and it does not
present a consensus view of the raison d’eˆtre of the tort system.88
Another important aspect of tort law is deterrence,89 which is the
prevailing law and economics perspective.90  The most prominent
example of this thought is the Hand Formula, which conceptualizes
negligence as a cost-benefit analysis of accident and precautionary
costs for the purpose of achieving optimal deterrence and social
cost.91  If corporation law imposes liability on directors to deter bad
business decisions, the laws of torts and corporations should converge.
85 Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 437, 463. R
86 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 262–63; Davis, supra note 3, at 575. R
87 See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (examining the theoretical justifications for tort law’s
aim of distributing losses).
88 There are many instances in tort law, especially mass torts and class actions,
where diffuse losses are concentrated against a single defendant.
89 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF TORT LAW 4 & n.12 (1987) (explaining that an important element of tort law
is to prevent like accidents from occurring in the future); Richard A. Posner, A Theory
of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–34 (1972) (considering what tort theory best
affects human behavior to prevent accidents).
90 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analy-
sis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 877–904 (1998); Robert J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory
of Punitive Damages, 111 MICH. L. REV. 33, 36, 52-53 (2012).
91 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1947); see
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 89, at 104. R
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However, prominent corporate law jurists have referenced a director’s
care to that of a driver or doctor, and have rejected the analogy as
“misleading”92 and “not well-suited to judicial review.”93  The plainest
statement of the underlying policy is found in In re Caremark Interna-
tional Inc. Derivative Litigation94: “It is doubtful that we want business
men and women to be encouraged to make decisions as hypothetical
persons of ordinary judgment and prudence might.”95  Scholars have
also analogized a director’s negligence to common torts, and have dis-
missed tort law as irrelevant.96
At first blush, this consensus view seems right.  The duty of care is
dressed in the language of torts,97 and yet directors are not held to a
negligence standard for business losses.  Courts and scholars correctly
argue that directors must not be held liable for negligent, stupid, care-
less, unlucky, or egregious decisions in spite of any visceral impulse to
blame and levy liability for a bad outcome.98  Of course, such a con-
cept is antithetical to tort law.  Since tort law finds liability for negli-
gence and corporation law does not, inter-doctrinal divergence seems
correct on the surface.  But upon a deeper analysis this argument is
flawed.
92 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
93 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 n.16 (Del. Ch.
1996).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 967–68 n.16.
96 See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 243; Allen et al., Realigning, supra note 4, R
at 454; Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 88; Davis, supra note 3, at 581–82; Hansen, supra R
note 4, at 1357–58; see also Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the R
Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1241
(1986) (“A careful reading of the cases illustrates the substantial difference between
applying the due care test in tort law and the standard actually employed by the courts
in reaching decisions under corporate law.”); Rosenberg, supra note 64, at 310 (not- R
ing that most people would be “extremely reluctant to suggest that the concept of the
reasonable person that pervades other areas of law (such as torts) should be applica-
ble to corporate directors”).
97 See supra notes 6 & 28 and accompanying text; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, R
supra note 1, at 93 (analogizing the fiduciary principle to tort law); Allen et al., Func- R
tion Over Form, supra note 4, at 1301 (“Thus, claimed breaches of the duty of care were R
essentially subjected to traditional tort analysis, i.e., whether the duty was violated,
and if so, whether the violation caused harm to the corporation or the shareholders,
and the burden of proof fell upon the plaintiff.”); Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 439 R
(“The duty of care of corporate directors and officers is a special case of the duty of
care imposed throughout the law under the general heading of negligence.”); Han-
sen, supra note 4, at 1355 (“The traditional formulation of a director’s duty of care R
uses a ‘reasonably prudent man’ standard quite like that of tort law.”).
98 See supra note 60. R
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The tort analogy fails because scholars and jurists have focused
on the difference in judicial outcomes, and have wrongly assumed
that the application of tort law would require a substantive review of
business decisions under the negligence standard.  However, the
divergence of outcomes is not as meaningful, and the better inquiry
focuses on the reasons why outcomes diverge, which is a search for a
common analytical framework under which courts formulate duty and
its limitation.
We start with the basic observation that the negligent doctor
should be liable to his patient, or the negligent driver to the pedes-
trian, and so forth in the infinite ways negligence can result in liabil-
ity.  However, a cursory review of tort law also shows that liability can
be cut off even when there has been a “wrong” or bad conduct in
some ordinary, visceral sense.  For example, when a railway employee
negligently pushed a customer into a train thereby dislodging hidden
explosives, he had no duty to a passenger standing in the distance who
was injured in the subsequent explosion.99  When a water company
negligently failed to provide sufficient water to a city with which it had
a contract to provide water, it had no duty to a city resident whose
warehouse burned down due to inadequate water pressure.100  When
an accounting firm negligently certified the solvency of an insolvent
client’s balance sheet, it had no duty to a creditor who relied on the
certification and made a bad loan to the client.101  When a dry dock
negligently damaged the propeller of a ship, thereby preventing the
ship from carrying out its charter, it had no duty to the charterer of
the ship for lost profit.102  When a negligent driver caused a traffic
delay in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, he had not committed a wrong
to the investment banker who lost out on a million dollar deal result-
ing from the delay.103  In each of these cases, the defendants could be
said to have erred in conforming their behavior to some ideal stan-
dard, but in each case the court ruled that there was no legal wrong to
the one who was injured.  The analogy of a director’s decision to a
doctor’s negligence, as frequently asserted in corporate law scholar-
ship, misconceives the analysis.104  A legal wrong is a flexible concept.
The duty of care in corporation law establishes the basic idea that
a director owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation—a fairly uncon-
99 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
100 H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
101 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
102 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). .
103 See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968) (providing
the hypothetical).
104 See supra note 96. R
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troversial point in the abstract.  The controversy surrounds defining
the scope of that duty and its theoretical justification. “Studies of cor-
porate law have not inquired into the definition of a reasonable direc-
tor because the prevailing wisdom has been that the law calls for no
such inquiry.”105  Corporate law is exceptional, the argument goes,
because if it is not, the scope of duty would encompass negligence for
making substantive business decisions.  This fear is misplaced.
II. DUTY OF CARE AND AFFIRMATIVE UNDERTAKING
What is the duty of care?  What obligation does it impose?  What
are its limits?  These questions can be answered in a theoretically
coherent way, consistent with the policy prescriptions that accompany
the business judgment rule, through the analytics of tort law.
In tort law, since one’s actions can potentially harm many victims,
it is said that a person owes a “duty to the world.”106  But strictly speak-
ing, duty is not so expansive.107  “Negligence, like risk, is thus a term
of relation.”108  In most ordinary situations, the imposition of a fore-
seeable risk to a cognizable interest of another creates a sufficient
relational nexus for duty to arise.109  The requirement of a sufficient
connection between actors independent of factual causation in a for-
tuitous event explains why there is no general duty to act affirmatively
on behalf of someone’s welfare absent some preexisting relationship
or special circumstance.110  When one undertakes such care111 or
105 Rosenberg, supra note 64, at 312. R
106 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) (“The proposition is this: Every one owes to the world at large the duty of
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.”).
107 See generally W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 671 (2008) (discussing the distinct treatment of the concept of duty in California
courts and the Third Restatement); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Shielding Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other
“Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329
(2006) (critiquing the diagnosis offered by Dilan Esper and Greg Keating concerning
the California courts’ abuse of the duty concept).
108 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
109 “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”
Id. at 100. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537, 571 (1972).
110 See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (finding physician
under no duty to render professional services to everyone who applied); Yania v.
Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
111 See, e.g., United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1955); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965); see also Charles O. Gregory, Gratuitous Under-
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stands in a special relationship,112 the law imposes a duty of care
where there would otherwise have been none.
The modern public corporation is characterized by a separation
of ownership and control in the corporation,113 and this requires a
board of directors to assume the mantle of managerial power on
behalf of the corporation.114  This affirmative undertaking and special
relationship beget a director’s duty of care.  One need not belabor the
point that directors owe a fiduciary duty of care to the corporation.115
The primary instrumental function of the duty of care is to say that
there is a legal duty as a matter of law, which seems readily apparent
but is nevertheless a significant proposition requiring an affirmative
statement of law.116  However, the existence of a duty does not answer
the more difficult question of the scope of that duty.  Justice Frank-
furter’s famous statement on fiduciary duty is apropos:
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry.  To whom is he a fiduciary?  What obli-
gations does he owe as fiduciary?  In what respect has he failed to
discharge these obligations?  And what are the consequences of his
deviation from duty?117
The existence of a duty invokes the abstraction that a director
must act reasonably, but it does not give substance to what “reasona-
ble” means in the context of the voluntary association between the
takings and the Duty of Care, 1 DEPAUL L. REV. 30, 35 (1951); Warren A. Seavey, Reliance
upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913, 928 (1951).
112 See, e.g., Brosnahan v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 892 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir.
1989) (discussing airline’s duty to supervise boarding process for the safety of passen-
gers); In re Trans-Pacific Fishing & Packing Co., 152 F. Supp. 44, 47 (W.D. Wash.
1957) (holding that a ship owners have a special obligation to the seamen employed
on their ships to keep the ships seaworthy and in safe working condition); Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (discussing a therapist’s
duty to known potential victims of a violent patient; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
113 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan Co. 1982) (1932).
114 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b)
(2011).
115 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
101 (Del. 2007).
116 Compare Scott, supra note 4, at 937 (arguing that “very little of any value would R
be lost by outright abolition of the legal duty of care”), with Johnson, Rethinking, supra
note 4, at 807 (arguing for “[r]estoring due care as a meaningful cornerstone of Dela- R
ware law”). Cf. Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J. Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 589, 589 (2006) (observing that the duty of care no longer exists in
Delaware).
117 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943).
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director and the corporation.  Tort law teaches us that “[p]roof of
negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do,”118 and likewise corpo-
ration law must give substance to the meaning of duty, negligence,
and wrong.119
The nature of a director’s undertaking of care invokes two princi-
ples of tort law that govern the scope of duty: (1) duty arising from
affirmative undertaking; and (2) industry custom as to the standard of
care.
A. Duty from Undertaking
Since the fiduciary duty of care arises out of a voluntary principal-
agent relationship between the corporation and the director, 120 the
scope of that duty is defined by the nature of affirmative undertaking.
This view is consistent with the contractarian perspective that corpora-
tion law provides implied contractual terms of the relationship among
factors of production.121  Insofar as fiduciary duty is concerned, the
contractarian analysis ultimately serves the tort function of defining
the boundary of liability.  The contract analogy is a convenient meta-
phor expressing the simple fact that, in an era in which involuntary
servitude has long been eradicated, business enterprise is conducted
through voluntary relationships among economic actors seeking gain.
Moving forward from this obvious starting point, the tort analogy pro-
vides the legal framework defining the liability scheme.  With that
said, there is no clear analytic division between contract and tort anal-
118 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting FREDER-
ICK POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 455 (11th ed. 1920)).
119 See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88
TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010) (discussing the nature of a civil wrong under tort law).
120 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
121 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 27–28 (describing the corporation as a “nexus R
of contracts”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 12 (“So we often speak of the R
corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or a set of implicit and explicit contracts.”); see
also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (describing a
corporation as “simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for con-
tracting relationships” (emphasis omitted)).  This view of the corporation is not with-
out criticism. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (looking to public corporation law as substi-
tute for explicit contracts); see also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992) (describing competing theories
of the corporation).
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yses.  Many tort problems of assigning liability can be analyzed
through a contract prism.122
The principal term in the contract between the corporation and
its directors is an undertaking of care.  The duty to care is not met
merely by a demonstration of scienter alone.  A good-hearted director
of empty deeds is not privileged in the eyes of the law.  The duty to
care requires affirmative acts of care.  In concrete terms, this means
that directors must act in good faith toward exercising corporate pow-
ers in furtherance of the corporate interest.  If so, we expect to see
judicial rulings that, notwithstanding the business judgment rule, a
breach of the duty of care may result from dereliction of duty, failure
to exercise responsibility, and lack of good faith effort toward the care
of the corporation.123  Such a line of cases has long existed.
In Briggs v. Spaulding,124 a bank went insolvent as a result of mis-
conduct of its officers and employees, and the plaintiffs sued the
directors on the theory that they failed to adequately supervise and
monitor the bank.125  The court held:
They are entitled under the law to commit the banking business, as
defined, to their duly-authorized officers, but this does not absolve
them from the duty of reasonable supervision, nor ought they to be
permitted to be shielded from liability because of want of knowl-
edge of wrong-doing, if that ignorance is the result of gross inatten-
tion . . . .126
Thus the duty “includes something more than officiating as figure-
heads.”127
In Barnes v. Andrews,128 a bankruptcy receiver sued a director for
the failure of a corporation, arguing on the theory that the director
was guilty of neglect, omission, and inadequate oversight.129  Interest-
ingly, the cause of action was brought under tort law on the theory of
omission when there is a duty to act.130  The trial judge, Learned
122 “Hypothetical-contract analysis is a powerful tool for understanding tort law
and determining its scope.”  Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir.
2003).
123 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 448 (“Accordingly, the duty to monitor, the duty R
of inquiry, and the duty to employ a reasonable decision-making process are normally
not protected by the business-judgment rule.”).
124 Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
125 Id. at 134–38.  The case was subsequently overruled on the ground that it vio-
lated the Erie doctrine.  Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 226 (1997).
126 Briggs, 141 U.S. at 165–66.
127 Id. at 165.
128 Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
129 Id. at 615–16.
130 Id. at 616.
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Hand, found that the defendant failed to keep informed and was a
“figurehead,” and liability could be imposed for a failure of duty.131
However, the court ruled that the receiver failed to show causation
between the director’s negligence and the corporation’s financial
injury.132
In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 133 a director failed to monitor the
company, abdicated all responsibility for oversight, including a failure
to attend board meetings, and was unqualified to perform the tasks of
a director because she did not understand the business at a basic level.
Reasoning that “all directors are responsible for managing the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation,” the court imposed liability against
the neglectful director, and made clear that the key sin was her failure
to undertake affirmative care of the corporation.134
In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff argued
that the directors failed to take action designed to uncover and pre-
vent violations of federal antitrust laws.135  The Delaware Supreme
Court stated that “absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the
directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to fer-
ret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”136
However, the court made clear that if a director “has refused or
neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored
either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of
employee wrongdoing, the law will cast the burden of liability upon
him.”137
In In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, Chancellor
William Allen ruled that liability for failure to monitor occurs only
upon “a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise over-
sight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable infor-
mation and reporting system [exists] . . . .”138  This standard is
consistent with the idea that a director must affirmatively care for the
corporation, but there is no obligation to provide some objective, neg-
ligence-based level of care.  Findings of liability are rare because an
131 Id. at 615–16.
132 Id. at 617. Barnes stands for the proposition that negligence must cause an
injury for liability to attach. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 288–89; CLARK, supra note 1, R
at 126.  This is perfectly consistent with tort law as the inquiry of the breach of duty is
separate from causation.  Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920).
133 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
134 Id. at 823–24.  “The sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the enter-
prise he is charged to protect.” Id. at 822.
135 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
136 Id. at 130.
137 Id.
138 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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uncaring director is functionally the equivalent of a director who has
abdicated her duty to undertake care within the social and institu-
tional setting of a bard and fellow peers.  This explains why a failure of
the duty to monitor is “possibly the most difficult theory in corpora-
tion law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”139
In the Disney litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court defined bad
faith as the intentional dereliction of duty:  “Deliberate indifference
and inaction in the face of a duty to act is, in my mind, conduct that is
clearly disloyal to the corporation.  It is the epitome of faithless con-
duct.”140  A failure of good faith may be shown “where the fiduciary
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrat-
ing a conscious disregard for his duties.”141  On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court endorsed these standards.142
In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court endorsed the
Caremark standard of “sustained or systematic failure” of oversight, but
categorized this type of failure as a duty of loyalty violation.143  Echo-
ing the language in its Disney opinion, the court reiterated: “Where
directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrat-
ing a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their
duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good
faith.”144  Thus, duty is framed as a conscious disregard of one’s
affirmative responsibilities.145
This line of cases shows that the duty of care is not meaningless
verbiage, which is not to say that liability is or should be common-
place.  When the scope of duty is viewed as a duty of affirmative under-
taking, there is the real possibility of liability.146  Liability is predicated
139 Id. at 967.
140 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (foot-
note omitted).
141 Id.
142 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62–67 (Del. 2006).
143 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
144 Id. at 370 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  This conscious disregard
standard is similar to the tort definition of intent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 8A (1965) (“The word ‘intent’ . . . denote[s] that the actor . . . believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”).
145 The Delaware Supreme Court characterized a Caremark violation as a violation
of the duty of loyalty. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
146 As one commentator has noted, “similar patterns of exacerbated neglect con-
stitute the only circumstances in which directors have been found liable in the non-
decision-making context in spite of the use of the tort-derived formulation of the duty
of care.”  Hansen, supra note, 96 at 1248 & n.45 (listing cases exemplifying this pat- R
tern).  “Accordingly, the duty to monitor, the duty of inquiry, and the duty to employ
a reasonable decision-making process are normally not protected by the business-
judgment rule.”  Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 448. R
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on a failure to undertake the care of the corporation, and this is con-
sistent with the rule that the business judgment rule protects directors
only when they have taken action by exercising judgment.147  Liability
is few and infrequent not because most boards always make correct
substantive decisions, but because we do not expect to see a breach of
the fundamental obligation agreed upon between a corporation and a
board through systematic failure of the cohort of directors forming an
institution that is legally obligated to care for the corporation, though
sometimes this happens or is adjudged to have occurred.148
B. Custom as the Scope of Duty
In defining the scope of duty, courts have distinguished between
a failure to undertake affirmative care and a failure to undertake suffi-
cient care.  The question is: Why isn’t sufficient care a fundamental
obligation of the duty of care between the corporation and the board?
The tort principle of customs in establishing the standard of care
informs the answer.
The tort doctrine of customs provides the concrete analytical
framework of the rules of law governing duty and liability.  When par-
ties are constituents of a market, many tort problems of allocating
losses can be analyzed as a contract problem concerting industry cus-
toms and standards.  Samuel Arsht has hinted a connection between
industry customs under tort law and a director’s scope of duty under
corporate law: “[T]he primary function of the business judgment rule
may be simply to accord to directors the same necessary protection
that professionals enjoy under Anglo-American tort law if sued for
malpractice.”149  This insight requires further development.
With respect to customs of an industry or profession, courts
determine the scope of one’s duty under the principle set forth in
Learned Hand’s opinion in The T.J. Hooper.150  There, Hand famously
147 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (“[The business judgment
rule] has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a
conscious decision, failed to act.”); Johnson, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 808 (“Direc- R
tor neglect of corporate affairs, or a director’s abdication of his or her duties, is a
violation of care in this most fundamental, statutory sense.”); supra note 51. R
148 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985); September 21, 2005: Court Grants Final
Approval of all Settlements, WORLDCOM SEC. LITIG., http://www.worldcomlitigation.
com/ (last updated Oct. 2, 2012) (indicating that the directors of WorldCom person-
ally paid $24,750,000 in liability as a part of a settlement for the collapse of the com-
pany during their tenure).
149 Arsht, supra note 4, at 97. R
150 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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advanced this proposition: “Courts must in the end say what is
required; there are precautions so imperative that even their universal
disregard will not excuse their omission.”151  However, the principle
in T.J. Hooper is modified somewhat when contractual constituents are
seen as fixing the standard of care with respect to market transactions
amongst themselves.  For example, in the realm of professional mal-
practice the implied and express terms of the industry standard of
care is often dispositive.152
Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National
Marine, Inc.153 illustrates a contractarian analysis of customary industry
standards in accident law.  There, a barge owned by A cast adrift when
it slipped its moorings at a dock operated by B, and collided with
another dock and two boats, causing damages to P.154  The defend-
ants A and B conceded that at least one of them was liable to P.155
The issue concerned the allocation of liability between A and B.  Pos-
ner begins the analysis with this emphasis: “Although in form a tort
case, in economic reality this is a contract case.”156  The principle set
forth in The T.J. Hooper “is obviously sound when one is speaking of
the duty of care to persons with whom the industry whose customary
standard of care is at issue has no actual or potential contractual rela-
tion.”157  Only through tort liability can the costs of injury be made a
cost to industry, thus deterring socially undesirable activities.158  But
when the parties are bound together in a market relationship, “the
market itself fixes a standard of care that reflects the preferences of
potential victims as well as of potential injurers and then the principal
function of tort law, it could be argued, is to protect customers’ rea-
sonable expectations that the firms with which they deal are comply-
ing with the standard of care customary in the industry, that is, the
standard fixed by the market.”159  While courts ultimately set the stan-
dard of care, they should defer to the implied expectations of market
151 Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
152 See WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS 166 (2d
ed. 2009) (“[M]edical malpractice is an unusual area of tort law where compliance
with custom is decisive rather than just evidentiary.”).
153 Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993).
154 Id. at 881.
155 Id. at 882.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 888.
158 Id. (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)).
159 Id. at 888–89.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 29  8-MAR-13 16:03
2013] duty  of  care  and  business  judgment 1167
participants in determining the loss allocation amongst them, i.e., the
scope of liability.160
The doctrine and principle of industry customs provide essential
insights into corporation law’s liability scheme.  Since the basis of a
director’s duty of care is the assent of the agent to serve, the scope of a
director’s duty of care should be based on an implied contract analy-
sis.161  The implied contractual terms on the scope of duty are fairly
clear, and are seen in the many policy justifications for the business
judgment rule.  One such policy reason is that rational directors
would surely not assume the risk of liability for mistakes, whether
determined to be negligent or not.162  Directors are not compensated
to assume enormous risk; they are not an insurer of the corporation’s
economic value.  They would be poor substitutes for more efficient
means to insure against the exposure to any given stock.  Sharehold-
ers can mitigate exposure to the risk of any given stock through hedg-
ing or diversification.  Since an investment in the market cannot be
guaranteed, which is to say that equity investments are never risk-free,
directors would not agree to provide downside protection to the cor-
poration or shareholders.  Any attempt to impose that term of agency
would result in no undertaking at all.  As Judge Ralph Winter has
explained, “the business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain
voluntariness in undertaking the risk of bad business decisions.”163
This understanding is a basic condition of a director’s service.164  The
corporation and shareholders must assume the risk of economic loss,
lest directors will not assume the obligation of care.
The implied understanding does not go so far as producing a
liability-free scope of duty because the bargaining for terms is not one-
sided.  Aside from the irrationality of the oxymoron, any attempt by
160 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §6.3 (8th ed. 2011) (criti-
cizing Hand’s approach in The T.J. Hooper).
161 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 12 (“[T]he corporation is a volun- R
tary adventure, and that we must always examine the terms on which real people have
agreed to participate.”).
162 “The reason, bluntly stated, is that corporate directors and officers invest other
people’s money.  They bear the full costs of any personal liability, but they receive
only a small fraction of the gains from a risky decision.” ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at R
243.
163 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982).
164 See Arsht, supra note 4, at 97; Balotti & Hanks, supra note 66, at 1342; Block et R
al., supra note 4, at 490; McMurray, supra note 27, at 616; see also Smith v. Brown- R
Borhek Co., 200 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. 1964) (“Such persons would rarely ever accept a
directorship if they could be held liable for every ‘bad’ account or every mistake of
judgment.”); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829) (“No man would
undertake to render a service to another on such severe conditions.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 30  8-MAR-13 16:03
1168 notre dame law review [vol. 88:3
directors to seek a “no liability” term in hypothetical bargaining would
result in a rejection of the undertaking by the corporation.165  Direc-
tors must bond their agreement to serve with some enforceable
obligation.
The nature of a director’s obligation is obfuscated by a mischie-
vous misnomer of preposition.  The duty of care is descriptively better
stated as a duty to care.166  The ordinary use of “duty of care” as a term
of legal art is shorthand for the duty to comply with some substantive
level of prescriptive care, independent of good faith scienter, and
attempt to comply with the prescription.  This concept is seen in tort
law’s rejection of the stupid person defense.167  The term is routinely
used without much thought to its semantic construction because in
most tort cases it conveys the right idea of focusing on the quality of
care.  But it does mischief when its shorthand definition clouds the
nature of the obligation.  The prepositional correction “duty to care”
is more than a superficial semantic change.  It emphasizes intent
invoking a quality of good faith undertaking.  This distinction goes to
the heart of Delaware’s substantive-procedural dichotomy.  In an
arms-length bargaining with the corporation for the terms of service,
rational directors would agree that their obligation is fundamentally
custodial in nature.  The directors have taken an affirmative obliga-
tion to take custody of the corporation, which is the core of the sepa-
ration of ownership and control, and consistent with this obligation
they have undertaken the duty to care for the corporation.
At the core of this duty is a director’s good faith and honest
intention as evinced by affirmative deeds consistent with their heart.
In short, directors have a duty to care for the corporation, which
manifests in the affirmative engagement of activities consistent with
good faith intention to care—a duty to exercise business judgment, to
monitor, and generally to assume the mantle of authority and
responsibility.168
165 See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 37 (2010) (“When
filling gaps in the corporate contracts, courts cannot look to the actual intent of
thousands of parties so they make up a hypothetical ‘intent’ based on what the courts
view as reasonable.”).
166 Indeed, Lyman Johnson has previously focused on the custodial nature of a
director’s duty, and as a result he formulated a similar construction of the term: “The
board therefore is to ‘take care of’ the corporation’s business and affairs . . . . [A
violation of care] is a failure to direct, or ‘take care of,’ the corporation.”  Johnson,
supra note 4, at 808. R
167 See supra note 61. R
168 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 807–08. R
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This understanding is consistent with the business judgment rule.
This passage nicely summarizes the concept:
[H]ow does the operation of the . . . “business judgment rule” tie in
with the concept of negligence?  There is no conflict between the
two.  When courts say that they will not interfere in matters of busi-
ness judgment, it is presupposed that judgment—reasonable dili-
gence—has in fact been exercised.  A durector [sic] cannot close his
eyes to what is going on about him in the conduct of the business of
the corporation and have it said that he is exercising business judg-
ment.  Courts have properly decided to give directors a wide lati-
tude in the management of the affairs of a corporation provided
always that judgment, and that means an honest, unbiased judg-
ment, is reasonably exercised by them.169
In other words, the failure to undertake affirmative, good faith
care of the corporation defines the meaning of “negligence” in the
context of corporation law.  The modern formulation of the business
judgment rule incorporates the definition of negligence when it
presumes that in making a business decision a director “acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.”170  A shareholder
must overturn this presumption, which is to say that he must prove a
breach of duty, by presenting particular evidence to the contrary on
these matters: a business action was taken; the decision was not
informed; or it was not in good faith.  Thus, the business judgment
rule gives substance to the question: What does it mean when we say
that a director has been negligent and failed to meet the standard of
care?
The critical misunderstanding has been a conflation of an “error”
with a “wrong,” and the resulting strained efforts to rationalize two
conflicting visceral senses: on the one hand the correctness of the case
outcomes, and on the other hand the felt need for accountability for
mistakes.  This tension is also seen in tort law.  In torts, negligence is
always an error, but an error is not always a civil wrong.  The applica-
ble principle was famously set forth by Cardozo in Palsgraf: The scope
of duty cannot be discerned by reference to an isolated examination
of the quality of the conduct for it “is built upon the shifting meanings
of such words as ‘wrong’ and ‘wrongful,’ and shares their instabil-
ity.”171  While a director could be said to have committed a “mistake”
169 Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (emphasis added).
170 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
171 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
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or an “error” upon a demonstrably poor decision,172 the legal concept
of duty does not support such a definition.  “Negligence in the
abstract, apart from things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is
understandable at all.”173  One of the earliest applications of the busi-
ness judgment rule, seen in Percy v. Millaudon, recognized this tort-
based principle of duty:
The only correct mode of ascertaining whether there was fault in an
agent, is by enquiring whether he neglected the exercise of that dili-
gence and care, which was necessary to a successful discharge of the
duty imposed on him.  That diligence and care must again depend on
the nature of the undertaking.  There are many things which, in their
management, require the utmost diligence, and most scrupulous
attention, and where the agent who undertakes their direction, ren-
ders himself responsible for the slightest neglect.  There are others,
where the duties imposed are presumed to call for nothing more
than ordinary care and attention, and where the exercise of that
degree of care suffices.
The directors of banks from the nature of their undertaking, fall
within the class last mentioned, while in the discharge of their ordi-
nary duties. . . . In relation to these officers, the duties of directors
are those of controul, and the neglect which would render them responsi-
ble for not exercising that controul properly, must depend on circumstances,
and in a great measure be tested by the facts of the case.  If nothing
has come to their knowledge, to awaken suspicion of the fidelity of
the president and cashier, ordinary attention to the affairs of the
institution is sufficient.  If they become acquainted with any fact cal-
culated to put prudent men on their guard, a degree of care com-
mensurate with the evil to be avoided is required, and a want of that
care certainly makes them responsible.174
The point in Percy illustrates Cardozo’s concept that wrongs can-
not be discerned in the abstract, but that the determination depends
on “the nature of the undertaking.”175  Tort law readily provides the
core principle that certain conduct, like firing a gun randomly, is
wrong in some circumstances (e.g., in a crowded city) and not wrong
in other circumstances (e.g., on a deserted island).
In the corporation law context, market participants set the
implied terms of care.  The failure to conform one’s action to a rea-
sonable person has shifting meanings.  The inquiry in tort cases
172 See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1976),
aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976).
173 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101 (citations omitted).
174 Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 74–75 (La. 1829) (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 74.
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focuses on the quality of the particular decision and the outcome as
the measure of reasonableness, and thus an error in judgment results
in a legal wrong.  The inquiry in corporation law focuses on the
demonstrable effort and the quality of decisionmaking as the measure
of reasonableness, and thus an error in judgment is not a wrong.  The
answer to the question—what would a reasonable director do?—does
not lie in a review of the substance of the business decisions,176 but
instead on the substance of good faith and effort made by the custodi-
ans toward the care of the corporation.
III. BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND ECONOMIC LOSS
The conventional account of the failed tort analogy is also flawed
because commentators have analogized the rules in corporate law to
rules in tort law applicable to physical loss.  The assumption is wrong,
leading to a wrong analysis.  Tort law distinguishes the interests at
stake and the types of harms suffered, leading to different doctrinal
frameworks for assessing liability.177  For example, emotional harms
and pure economic losses are treated differently than injuries to per-
son or property.178  Melvin Eisenberg has noted this distinction.179
Robert Thompson has gone so far as to suggest a possible link
between the doctrine of pure economic loss and the corporate liability
scheme:
Tort law provides a structure to understand the separate “wrongful-
ness” of fraud, but in a way that also could suggest limits on recov-
ery. By recognizing lying as a wrong, law recognizes this conduct as
an inappropriate way of treating people that gives rise to an individ-
ual right of redress, separate from the substantive decision. But as a
dignitary tort different from traditional physical torts, there might
be additional limits in the same way that common law courts have
176 Other commentators have suggested the same: “[I]f a director has no conflict-
ing interest, is reasonably informed, and makes a good-faith judgment . . . , what
possible basis for liability exists?  The answer, we think, is that there is none—not
because the business judgment rule exists but because there is no breach of directo-
rial duty.” ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 256. R
177 See Cardi & Green, supra note 107, at 673–82. R
178 See generally Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 806 (2004) (analyzing emotional distress
claims); Rhee, supra note 22, at 50 (providing a theory of the doctrine of pure eco- R
nomic loss).
179 See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 444 (“[U]nlike most types of negligence cases, R
negligent decisions by directors or officers characteristically involve neither personal
injury nor economic damages that are catastrophic to an individual.”).
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continued to put limits on pure economic loss cases different from
physical torts.180
Eisenberg and Thompson make an important point about the
nature of the corporation’s injury.  They have pointed us in the right
direction.  The next step in constructing a corrected tort analogy is an
interdoctrinal analysis of principles and theories governing pure eco-
nomic loss.
The rule of pure economic loss is simply stated: While there is a
general duty of care to avoid foreseeable physical harm,181 there is no
duty to take precaution against negligently inflicted pure economic
loss.182  This rule is seen in Holmes’ opinion in Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v. Flint.183  The plaintiff charterer suffered lost profits when
the defendant dry dock negligently damaged the propeller of the
owner’s boat.184  The Court held that the dry dock had no duty to the
charterer and set forth the general rule that “a tort to the person or
property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another
merely because the injured person was under a contract with that
other, unknown to the doer of the wrong.”185  The pure economic
loss rule and the business judgment rule share a number of common-
alities.  Both are nearly universal.186  Both have been traditionally
explained in instrumental, pragmatic terms, focusing on the problem
created by broad exposure to liability for defendants.187  Both invoke
the principle that the law abhors disproportionate liability or
penalty.188
180 Thompson, supra note 19, at 889. R
181 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM §7(a) & cmt. a reporters’ note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
182 See Rhee, supra note 22, at 56; see, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, R
824 (2d Cir. 1968); Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 269–70 (N.J. 1945).  The
pure economic loss rule dates back to the birth of negligence. See Conn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. N.Y. & N.H. R.R., 25 Conn. 265, 270 (1856); Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks
Co. [1875] 10 Q.B. 453 at 457.
183 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
184 Id. at 307.
185 Id. at 309
186 The rule of pure economic loss is virtually universal. See Robert L. Rabin,
Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 858
(2006); Rhee, supra note 22, at 56. R
187 See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1028–29 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir.
1985); Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence:
A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 48 (1972); Stephen R. Perry, Protected Inter-
ests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 262 (1992).
188 See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassess-
ment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1526, 1534 (1985); see also Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc.,
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These commonalities merit an analysis of the link between the
pure economic loss rule and the business judgment rule.  At the out-
set, I note that doctrinal analysis and comparison have one distinc-
tion.  Typically, in torts cases the ex ante relation between the
defendant and the plaintiff are remote, and they are connected only
by the accident resulting in economic loss; in corporate cases, there is
already a fiduciary relationship between a director and the corpora-
tion.189  While this distinction limits the doctrinal utility of the com-
parison, the theory of pure economic loss is relevant to the question
in corporate law: What is the theoretical justification for not imposing
a legal duty on a director to avoid negligently inflicting economic loss
on the corporation?
Two economic analyses explain the theoretical underpinning of
pure economic loss.  One focuses on a microeconomic analysis of
social cost.  The other focuses on a political economic analysis of
uncertainty and profit.
A. Social Cost of Economic Loss
William Bishop argued that the rule denies liability for pure eco-
nomic loss because in many cases there is not a social cost.190  In the
case of a physical loss such as lost lives or damaged property, the social
cost is apparent, but in economic loss cases there is often a transfer
payment—that is, a private cost to one is an equal private benefit to
another.191  By imposing liability, the law may over-deter an activity
that is otherwise efficiently deterred for the purpose of mitigating
social cost.  This theory is important and has an appealing elegance.
A typical fact-pattern illustrating the concept is seen in 532
Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc.192  A build-
ing collapse closed a Manhattan street.193  The plaintiff delicatessen
did not incur a physical loss but did suffer lost profit.194  It sued the
negligent parties who caused the building collapse, but the court held
683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Given the scale of operation of modern public
corporations, this stupefying disjunction between risk and reward for corporate direc-
tors threatens undesirable effects.”).
189 However, the existence of the fiduciary relationship relates back to an analysis
of implied customary terms between the principal and the agent, and the implied
professional standard provides the standard of liability.
190 Bishop, supra note 21, at 4. R
191 Id.
192 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097,
1100 (N.Y. 2001).
193 Id. at 1099.
194 Id. at 1100.
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that they did not owe a duty to the plaintiff under the doctrine of pure
economic loss.195  The economic harm was not a social cost.  Since
there is a deli in virtually every city block in Manhattan, the plaintiff’s
lost profit was offset by gains of other stores.  Bishop’s theory works
well to explain the denial of recovery.
Bishop concedes that his theory is too simple.196  The assessment
of social cost often “depends upon innumerable particular facts of
interacting markets.”197  The theory depends on empirically unveri-
fied assumptions: for example, sufficient excess capacity to meet
demand overflow by competitors; no marginal cost increases associ-
ated with capacity increase; elasticity of supply and demand as to sub-
stitute inputs, goods, and services; investor risk neutrality towards
variability of returns under different liability rules, and so forth.198  If
we relax these assumptions, the hypothesis of no social cost is far more
complicated.199  But in most cases the administrative costs of a
detailed economic inquiry would exceed whatever social cost was lost
in most cases.200  Ultimately, Bishop’s theory depends on the hypothe-
sis that “financial losses are only poorly correlated with social cost,”201
thus justifying a blanket rule of no duty.
Despite the limitation of Bishop’s theory, the core idea—that
pure economic loss from negligence is frequently not a social cost—is
important in thinking about liability for economic loss from poor
board decisions.  In many situations involving business decisions, the
private loss of the corporation and shareholders is apparent, but the
social cost is not.  The distributional aspect of value and wealth in
many market transactions results in transfer payments for which the
social cost is less apparent.  More broadly, the Schumpeterian process
of “creative destruction”202 assumes that private loss of firms leads not
to social cost, but in fact social gain in the form of innovation and
value creation built on the ruins of lesser firms and business models.
To be sure, there are cases where the social cost is readily apparent.
The clearest example is Enron where the board’s sustained failure
over a period of time resulted in the collapse of a corporation that
195 Id. at 1099.
196 Bishop, supra note 21, at 11. R
197 Id. at 13.
198 Id. at 11.
199 Id. at 13.
200 Id. at 17.
201 W. Bishop, Economic Loss: A Reply to Professor Rizzo, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
207, 207 (1982).  The assumption is “an empirical question” whose validity is
unknown and most probably unverifiable. Id. at 208.
202 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1950).
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previously was a legitimate business.203  Even in such cases, however,
the complex interactions with other market participants make the
accounting of gains and losses inordinately difficult even when the
magnitude of the loss suggests that there has been a net social loss. In
most cases of ordinary business loss, the intuition is that economic loss
resulting from poor business decisions are loosely, if not poorly, corre-
lated with social cost in a competitive market.
Bishop’s idea explains, in part at least, the judicial reluctance to
assess liability after a poor decision resulting in economic loss.  In
many cases of bad business outcomes there is simply a transfer pay-
ment.  Corporate law scholars and courts assume that shareholders of
public companies hold a diversified portfolio.204  A shareholder diver-
sifies away firm-specific risk and is exposed only to market risk.  In the
case of a transfer payment, the individual gains and losses net out in a
portfolio, suggesting that the diversified shareholder is not economi-
cally harmed from a board’s “negligent” decision.
Even if there is some social cost, as a more detailed economic
analysis may show, in many instances of business loss, the administra-
tive cost of ascertaining it would be high.  Judicial review is imperfect
to the task even as courts are competent to conduct such analysis.
Commentators have argued that liability rules as a corrective for direc-
tor error are inferior to market monitoring of agent performance.
Many disputes in torts or contracts are one-shot deals that require
judicial resolution to correct fault or breach.205  On the other hand,
corporations have long-term relations that create repeated opportuni-
ties for directors to internalize the cost they impose without judicial
intervention.206  Market forces can monitor director error and compe-
tence.  The capital market assesses the quality of the management
when it assigns the firm’s cost of capital.207  The labor market
monitors executives and directors by assigning differential values to
their labor.208  The capital markets qua information markets are effi-
cient on some level.209  Capital markets serving as monitors are said to
203 See generally MALCOLM S. SALTER, INNOVATION CORRUPTED (2008) (identifying
and analyzing the business, ethical, and legal causes of the Enron collapse).
204 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriva-
tive Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 n.16 (Del. Ch. 1996); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc.,
683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 29. See R
generally Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79 (1952) (providing the intel-
lectual foundation of modern portfolio theory).
205 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 94. R
206 Id. at 94–95.
207 Id. at 95–97; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 257. R
208 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 95–97. R
209 Id. at 96.
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be superior to courts because the judicial process is costly, and
because courts may have difficulties reconstructing the ex ante
risks.210
The argument of an imperfect judicial process is more plausible
than one based on judicial incompetence, but it does not wholly
explain the business judgment rule.  It presents a simplistic binary
choice between judicial review and market monitoring.  Markets are
not perfect in assessing corporate decisions and quality of manage-
ment.  For instance, the labor market should create proper incentives
through “ex post settling up,”211 but the current problem of excessive
executive compensation calls into question whether this “settling up”
process is efficient, or even works when the amount of compensation
diminishes an executive’s long-term incentives.212  Nor are the capital
markets perfect in assessing the quality of corporate decisions.  Com-
panies like Enron, Worldcom, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill
Lynch, Citigroup, and AIG were once market darlings.  Collectively
these very large, important companies, among many other inglorious
peers, failed within a decade of each other, and this fact alone speaks
to the imperfection of the markets.  The process of credit ratings has
exhibited systematic flaws for many years.213  More fundamentally,
uncertainty in the intrinsic value of an asset is the paradox upon
which markets exist.214  The value of an asset cannot be perfect and
must fluctuate around the intrinsic value within a broad band consti-
tuting the margin of market error.215  If so, it follows that markets can
and sometimes do err badly.216  Even if the market is better at moni-
toring than judicial review as a general proposition, the next step—
that the two constitute a binary choice—does not necessarily follow.
Much like the limitations of Bishop’s hypothesis, the argument
that the market should (almost) exclusively determine error rests on a
proposition incapable of empirical confirmation: Whether the market
or the judiciary is better suited to determine the good and bad of
board decisions.  Courts are uniquely competent to assess past events,
210 Id. at 98–99.
211 Id. at 95 (citing Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288, 295–306 (1980)).
212 See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2006)
(arguing that executive compensation is not correlated to performance).
213 See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down
for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 654–55 (1999).
214 Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 530–34 (1986).
215 This band may be characterized as a factor of two, meaning that at any given
time the stock can be undervalued by as much as 100 percent or overvalued by as
much as fifty percent. Id. at 533.
216 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed. 2005).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 39  8-MAR-13 16:03
2013] duty  of  care  and  business  judgment 1177
actions, and wrongs given a legal standard.  Egregious decisions and
other howlers can be called for what they are without calling into
question all bad outcomes.  Despite the imperfection of judicial
review, courts routinely, if not frequently, review the substantive mer-
its of a business decision.  If a plaintiff rebuts the presumption of the
business judgment rule by showing a violation of fiduciary duty, the
burden shifts to the defendants to prove the entire fairness of the
transaction.217  “Under the entire fairness standard of judicial review,
the defendant directors must establish to the court’s satisfaction that
the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price.”218
This requires the defendant to prove that the transaction was fair, and
the court to review the substance of the transaction.219  It is apparent
that the entire fairness standard is predicated on confidence that
courts, when necessary, can adequately perform review and monitor-
ing functions, and they can and do inject themselves into corporate
governance.
B. Political Economy of Lost Profit
An alternative economic-based theory explains that the pure eco-
nomic loss rule embodies a broad political and philosophical view of
economic organization and production.220  This theory completes the
conception of the duty of care and the business judgment rule, and it
requires unpacking.  It begins by categorizing business risk into two
types: Risk to production assets, which is the potential loss of a factor
of production; and risk to outcome, which is the potential loss of pro-
duction.221  The theory states that tort law does and should protect
production assets from negligent harm, but it does not and should
not protect against bad outcomes per ex post redistribution of profit
and loss.222  The theory reconciles the pure and the consequential
economic loss rules.223  In stating inverse propositions—economic
loss flowing from physical loss is recoverable but an adverse economic
outcome alone is not—the two rules express a unified proposition:
217 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
218 Id.; see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279–80 (Del.
1988); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983).
219 Cede, 634 A.2d at 371; see Block et al., supra note 4, at 491 (“This fairness stan- R
dard is an exacting standard, requiring rigorous judicial scrutiny of the transaction
with regard to both ‘fair dealing’ and ‘fair price.’”).
220 See Rhee, supra note 22, at 78–85. R
221 Id. at 52.
222 Id. at 53, 86.
223 If a plaintiff’s person or property has been injured, consequential economic
loss is recoverable. Id. at 49–50.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 40  8-MAR-13 16:03
1178 notre dame law review [vol. 88:3
The law promotes the goal of economic production by recognizing an
economic loss claim when a production asset is harmed; at the same
time, it preserves the condition necessary to pursue enterprise, which
is uncertainty of market outcomes, by not redistributing profit and
loss upon bad outcomes.
The pure economic loss rule must be contextualized to the the-
ory of uncertainty and profit.224  In the absence of uncertainty, there
is perfect information, meaning costless communication of all infor-
mation relevant to value among all members of society.225  Production
is in perfect sync with wants and needs; supply and demand are at
perfect equilibrium.  Perfect competition would ensure that the mar-
ginal cost of a production input is priced at the marginal benefit such
that there is no profit.  All economic exchanges can only take place at
one price.226  Division of labor and specialized risk taking by entrepre-
neurs lose their meaning because there would be no need for such
market functions.  The concept of profit would disappear,227 and so
too would firms since perfect information would obviate the need for
price discovery among factors of production.228
Of course, perfect competition is fantasy.  Information is imper-
fect and knowledge is incomplete.229  The outcomes of most business
decisions are uncertain because all future states of outcome cannot be
known.230  The production function of any enterprise is fraught with
uncertainty.231  Uncertainty is the condition precedent to profit,232
224 The relationship between uncertainty and profit was studied by Frank Knight.
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (Dover ed. 2006); see also PETER L.
BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS 219 (1996) (“Risk, Uncertainty and Profit is the first work
of any importance, and in any field of study, that deals explicitly with decision-making
under conditions of uncertainty.”).
225 KNIGHT, supra note 224, at 78, 86. R
226 Id. at 82.
227 See id. at 127 (“[I]t will be evident to anyone with a rudimentary understanding
of economic processes and analysis that profit (always in the sense of pure profit)
would be absent under the conditions of equilibrium with ‘perfect
competition’ . . . .”).
228 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937) (“The
main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a
cost of using the price mechanism.  The most obvious cost of ‘organising’ production
through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.”).
229 KNIGHT, supra note 224, at 199, 259. R
230 Id. at 231.
231 Id. at 237–38.
232 “The presence of true profit, therefore, depends on an absolute uncertainty in
the estimation of the value of judgment, or on the absence of the requisite organiza-
tion for combining a sufficient number of instances to secure certainty through con-
solidation.” Id. at 285.
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because profit is “a margin of error in calculation on the part of the
non-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who do not force the successful
entrepreneurs to pay as much for productive services as they could be
forced to pay.”233  Thus, uncertainty is the vital element in an economy
based on market exchange.
The pure economic loss rule arises out of this reality.  Since expo-
sure to business risk defines the engagement of enterprise, recovery for
pure economic loss would distort outcomes of competition under
Knightian uncertainty and conflict with a commitment to a political
economy based on market competition, risk taking, and innovation.
Corrective legal action is not required when occurrences of economic
loss are not a failure of precaution but are instead a natural, inevitable
market condition.  Thus, the pure economic loss rule is a judicial
acknowledgement of and commitment to a market economy, its pre-
conditions, and the structure of our political economy.234
The application of the production theory to the business judg-
ment rule is apparent.  Profit is possible only in a condition of uncer-
tainty, and it is achieved in many instances because of counterparty
error.  As Bishop suggested, “negligence” in business frequently
results in no net social cost, and instead errors produce the winners
and losers of market competition.235  With imperfect information as
the operative condition, bad outcomes in the course of repeated
transactions of a corporate going concern are inevitable.  Courts have
long recognized the nature of business risk and loss, and the inevita-
bility of losses:
The proprietor buys, is liable for purchases, and assumes risks and
profits.  There are, as is true of many concerns, some which result in
failure.  Injudicious locations, excessive capitalizations, have con-
tributed, now and again, to brief careers.  Mismanagement, fires,
rivalry, add to the causes.  Businesses come and go, and losses are
inevitable.  A business is without constitutional protection against
the hazards of competition.236
Inevitable accidents or losses are not considered the product of
negligence.  By refusing to correct bad outcomes, courts are respect-
233 Id. at 284.
234 Rhee, supra note 22, at 78. R
235 See Bishop, supra note 21 and accompanying text. R
236 State v. Chisesi, 175 So. 453, 459 (La. 1937) (quoting State v. Old Tavern Farm,
133 Me. 468, 476 (1935) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rowland v. Old
Dominion Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 18 S.E. 965, 966 (N.C. 1894) (“Losses, inevitable in
every business, will occur.”); Eagles Nest v. Ridinger, 684 S.E.2d 163, 167 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2009) (“We observe that investing cash in a business does not guarantee a profit
for the investor.”).
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ing and preserving the essential market conditions in which the cor-
poration and its constituencies transact.  There is a larger economic
philosophy beneath the business judgment rule.
Here again, the theories of pure economic loss lurk beneath the
commonly cited instrumental policy reasons.  In Joy v. North,237 Judge
Ralph Winter explains that
because potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is
very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create
incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions.  Some opportuni-
ties offer great profits at the risk of very substantial losses, while the
alternatives offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit.  Share-
holders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their hold-
ings.  In the case of the diversified shareholder, the seemingly more
risky alternatives may well be the best choice since great losses in
some stocks will over time be offset by even greater gains in others.
Given mutual funds and similar forms of diversified investment,
courts need not bend over backwards to give special protection to
shareholders who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not diver-
sifying.  A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alter-
natives thus may not be in the interest of shareholders generally.238
Similarly, in In re Caremark, Chancellor William Allen explained that
[t]he corporate form gets its utility in large part from its ability to
allow diversified investors to accept greater investment risk.  If those
in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable
for losses on the basis of a substantive judgment based upon what an
[sic] persons of ordinary or average judgment and average risk
assessment talent regard as “prudent” “sensible” or even “rational”,
such persons will have a strong incentive at the margin to authorize
less risky investment projects.239
These passages make two key points. Risky decisions produce a social
gain (and not a social loss), and the business judgment rule incen-
tivizes risk averse directors to take risks by shielding them from unfair
and disproportionate liability.240
These instrumental policy arguments are compelling.  They go a
long way toward explaining the business judgment rule.  However,
237 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
238 Id. at 886 (footnotes omitted).
239 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 n.16 (Del. Ch.
1996).
240 Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 444.  Directors bear the full costs of any personal R
liability, but receive only a fraction of the gain from risky decisions. ALLEN ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 243.  “Liability under a negligence standard therefore would predict- R
ably discourage officers and directors from undertaking valuable but risky projects.”
Id.
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standing on their own, they are subject to criticism.  For instance, one
can plausibly argue that in business there are good and bad risks.
While we want directors to take risks, society does not want too much
risk taking, which can also destroy value.241  A reasonable response to
the risk-incentive argument is that good risk taking should be
encouraged and bad risk taking should be deterred.  This is done in
torts to regulate conduct.  Arguably there may be a role for courts to
deter bad decision-making by imposing liability.  One can also plausi-
bly argue that while shareholders can diversify away specific-firm risk,
a rule of liability can reduce systemic market risk by incentivizing
more prudent risk taking across the entire portfolio of firms (just the
way that the tort system imposes a standard of care that enhances
safety across society).  Since liability acts as a deterrent, the question
still remains: Why should the courts not have a say in terms of the
quality of the board’s decisions vis-a`-vis the quality of the decision-
making procedure?242  The issue comes back to empirical question of
whether the judicial process is in fact an imperfect monitor of bad
decisions.
Rather than focusing on the instrumental question of the efficacy
of the judicial process, we should instead consider risk taking in a
broader light.  Business risk, which includes the risk of bad decisions,
is part and parcel with a market economy.  Uncertainty and profit are
conjoined twins.  In an efficient market, one must take risk to achieve
return.  If so, the business judgment rule is a judicial recognition that
financial harms to corporations are expected as an essential aspect of
partaking in enterprise risk.  That being the case, bad risk taking
should not be considered a civil “wrong.”  In other words, a board
does not have a duty to the corporation with respect to economic loss
from bad or negligent decisions.
A case that hints at this broader concept is Smith v. Brown-Borhek
Co.243  There, the board extended more than $650,000 of credit to a
single customer.244  This amount constituted eighty percent of the
corporation’s receivables and sixty-three percent of its assets, an
241 For instance, the main reason why fiduciary duty shifts to creditors when a firm
is insolvent is that shareholders are incentivized to take too much risk. See, e.g., Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099,
1155 & n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991).
242 “[I]f judicial decisionmaking could flawlessly sort out sound decisions with
unfortunate outcomes from poor decisions, and directors were confident that there
was no risk of hindsight-based liability, the case for the business judgment rule would
be substantially weaker.” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 261. R
243 Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 200 A.2d 398 (Pa. 1964).
244 Id. at 399.
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imprudent concentration of financial risk in the firm’s balance
sheet.245  The board knew or should have known that the customer’s
liabilities exceeded assets, and thus posed a substantial credit risk.  It
exercised bad judgment when it concentrated risk so heavily on one
client.  The customer defaulted on the credit, and the company was
forced to write off a substantial loss.246  The court concluded that the
conditions to applying the business judgment had been satisfied, and
thus held that there was no liability.247  The explanation for the busi-
ness judgment rule is informative:
The meaning and application of the “prudent man rule” (a) in the
field of a testamentary or inter vivos trust, containing relatively few
securities and (b) in the business or banking world are very differ-
ent.  For example, in the banking business bad loans or sour invest-
ments or unsuccessful business transactions are part and parcel of
that business and are charged off every year . . . . In the business
world of profit and loss, which is often popularly described as the profit sys-
tem, it is too often forgotten that all businesses do not flourish, nearly every
business has some losses and some bad accounts, and many insolvencies and
bankruptcies frequently occur even in these prosperous times.248
In the “profit system” of a market economy, economic losses of a
going concern are expected and unavoidable in the course of
repeated transactions.  The definition of negligence cannot include
inevitable outcomes that must result from the undertaking.  Thus, the
political economic underpinning of pure economic loss provides the
theory for the rule of no duty to prevent economic loss upon the
affirmative assumption of care in the corporate context.
C. Shareholder Loss and Privity
The above Parts have shown that, as between the corporation and
its directors, a negligent error or mistake causing losses is no “wrong”
when the board has complied in good faith with its obligation to care
for the corporation.  But is it a wrong as to shareholders?  After all, as
residual claimants, they are the first bearers of economic loss.  As a
matter of logic, if the scope of duty to the corporation does not
encompass negligently inflicted economic loss on the corporation, the
duty running to the shareholder should be no more.  That should
settle the matter, for as an economic and legal proposition the inter-
est of the corporation always trumps the pecuniary interest of share-
245 Id.
246 See id. at 399.
247 See id. at 403.
248 Id. at 401 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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holders.  Logic aside, a separate tort analysis under the privity
doctrine provides the theoretically correct answer that shareholders
have no cause of action for negligently caused economic losses.
Courts have frequently commented that “the directors owe fiduci-
ary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its sharehold-
ers.”249  This formulation implies that the duty owed to shareholders
ranks pari passu with that owed to the corporation.  But this is not the
case.  The board’s duty to the corporation is unwavering and unquali-
fied,250 but its duty to shareholders is not so absolute.  For example, in
takeovers, actual shareholder preference is no basis to impose liability
if the board disagrees with it.251  In insolvency, the board’s fiduciary
duty is no longer to shareholders, but pivots to creditors.252  When
shareholders threaten the interest of the corporation, the board may
take hostile actions against them to advance the corporation’s inter-
est.253  Ultimately, directors owe their fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion as a legal entity.254  Shareholders are one group of multiple
constituencies, including creditors, employees, customers, and suppli-
ers, and by virtue of their residual claim they best stand to represent
the corporation’s interest in a derivative suit.255  Thus, we can say that
the duty running from a director to the shareholder is not direct, but
flows through the corporation.
249 Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994)
(emphasis added).  The same formulation is seen elsewhere.  Alabama By-Products
Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 265 (Del. 1995); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmil-
lan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988).
250 Cf. Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Pub-
lic Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661,
714 (2010) (arguing that, in times of national crisis, there should be a fiduciary
exemption when a director acts on behalf of the public interest).
251 “That many, presumably most, shareholders would prefer the board to do oth-
erwise than it has done does not . . . afford a basis to interfere with the effectuation of
the board’s business judgment.”  Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 700, 750 (Del. Ch. 1989).
252 “It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.  When a
corporation is solvent, those duties may be enforced by its shareholders, who have
standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of the corporation because they are the
ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s growth and increased value.”  N. Am. Cath-
olic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007).
253 See Orban v. Field, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 335 (Del. Ch. 1997).
254 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 294.  Delaware leans toward the entity model of R
the corporation, and the corporation as a legal entity is ultimately the person to
whom the board owes its duty. See William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A
Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1079 (2002) (“Del-
aware law inclines towards the entity model.”).
255 Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101.
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The linearity of the contractual nexus among the board, the cor-
poration, and the shareholder is important from the standpoint of
legal duty.  A quick review of seminal cases in tort law shows that the
lack of a direct contractual privity precludes the finding of duty.  As
previously discussed, in Robins Dry Dock, there was a linear contractual
nexus among the dry dock, the ship owner, and the charterer.256  Yet,
there was a no tort duty from the dry dock to the charterer because
“[t]he injury to the propeller was no wrong to the [charterer] but only
to those to whom it belonged.”257  In H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co.,258 a city resident suffered losses from a fire when the water com-
pany provided insufficient water pressure under a contract with the
city.259  Chief Justice Cardozo ruled that the linear contractual link
among the water company, the city, and its residents does not create a
tort duty toward the residents.260  In the seminal case of Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche,261 an accountant negligently certified its client’s bal-
ance sheet, and, relying upon the certification, a creditor extended
credit.262  Chief Justice Cardozo dismissed the lawsuit for lack of duty
under the privity doctrine.263  Note that in each of these cases the
plaintiff was connected to the tortfeasor in a linear “nexus of
contract.”
We can apply the concept of privity and duty to corporation law.
The existence of a “nexus of contracts” among the board, the corpora-
tion, and the shareholder does not inexorably lead to the conclusion
that the board has a legal duty to prevent negligently inflicted eco-
nomic loss to shareholders.  Liability does not extend that far under
tort analysis.  Here again, the tort analogy holds to yield the correct
results seen in corporation law.
256 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307 (1927).
257 Id. at 308.
258 H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
259 Id. at 896–97.
260 Id. at 899.
261 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
262 Id. at 442. See generally Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent
Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17 (2003) (describing the
law for auditor liability).
263 Touche, 174 N.E. at 447.  He reasoned that a finding of duty to the creditor
would “expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indetermi-
nate time to an indeterminate class.” Id. at 444.  A similar reasoning is used in H.R.
Moch: “A promisor will not be deemed to have had in mind the assumption of a risk so
overwhelming for any trivial reward.”  159 N.E. at 898.  Note the similarity of this
reasoning to the frequently cited justification of the business judgment rule on the
ground that directors would not undertake their obligation given the cost-benefit of
such a position. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. R
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A CORRECTED TORT ANALOGY
A. The Role of Tort Principles in Corporate Law
The implication of this Article is that principles and theories of
tort law play an important role more broadly in corporation law.  The
duty of care and the business judgment rule are not the only imports
of tort principles into corporation law.  The idea of a civil wrong and
the theories supporting it are powerful analytic tools.264  Consider the
following examples of doctrines of corporation law that can be viewed
through the tort prism.
The fiduciary duty of loyalty prohibits a director from engaging
in conflict of interest transactions and otherwise expropriating corpo-
rate assets.  Principles of agency mandate a fiduciary duty of loyalty,265
but the core prohibition is also based on the tort concept that conver-
sion and fraud are civil wrongs.266
The doctrine of veil piercing, a judge-made law, can be under-
stood as a prohibition against fraud by controlling shareholders.  Ex
post undercapitalization alone is not a basis for piercing the corporate
veil since the invocation of the rule of limited liability occurs only
when a firm is undercapitalized after the fact.  Instead, while individ-
ual jurisdictions may differ on the precise standard, a core require-
ment of veil piercing is some sort of fraudulent behavior constituting
a wrong in the eyes of the court.267
In the realm of takeover law, the tort law of self-defense informs
Delaware’s standard for reviewing the appropriateness of a board’s
adoption of antitakeover defenses.  Under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co.,268 the target has the burden to establish that the board rea-
sonably perceived that the hostile takeover bid was a threat to the
264 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 11, at 1327 (noting that a breach of fiduciary R
duty may be considered as a “civil wrong”).
265 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary
duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency
relationship.”).
266 “Classic conflict of interest transactions and expropriation of assets find their
doctrinal roots, in part at least, in the civil wrongs of conversion and fraud.”  Rhee,
supra note 250, at 711. R
267 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at §4.3(A); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, R
at 58–59; see also, e.g., Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2
F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing corporate veil to be pierced “to prevent a fraud
or other wrong”); Perpetual Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Michaelson Props. Inc., 974
F.2d 545, 548 (4th Cir. 1992) (same); Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co.,
26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 816 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (same); Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552,
558 (Conn. 1967) (same).
268 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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corporation, and the takeover defensive measure adopted was reason-
able in response to the threat.269  The concept embodied in this stan-
dard is seen in the tort standard for self-defense, which provides
defensive measures cannot be “in excess of that which the actor cor-
rectly or reasonably believes to be necessary for his protection.”270
The laws of corporation and torts obviously intersect at the rule
of limited liability.  The rule influences the animating principles of
tort law.271  Incomplete compensation to tort creditors is an unfortu-
nate outcome of the operation of an efficient rule.272  To correct this
problem, while at the same time enforcing limited liability, we can
apply the theory of enterprise liability to the entire class of limited
liability business organizations.  Thus, limited liability can be
“bonded” by a mandatory compensation fund that would deliver more
compensation to tort victims while being neutral to efficiency consid-
erations of limited liability.273
Lastly, section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL) is a clear example of the tort foundation of the fiduciary
duty.  This section provides that a corporate charter may provide a
“provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach
of fiduciary duty as a director.”274  This provision permits a corpora-
tion to opt out of director liability for a breach of the duty of care.275
269 Id. at 954–55.  In Unocal, the court modified the ordinary operation of the
business judgment rule. Id. at 954.  Because the threat of board self-perpetuation is
so substantial in the takeover context, the board’s adherence to is fiduciary duty “calls
for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judg-
ment rule may be conferred.” Id.  The court further suggested that the business judg-
ment rule would not protect the board when it erects unreasonable defensive
measures. Id. at 955.
270 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 70(1) (1965).
271 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liabil-
ity for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1916–23 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1612 (1991).
272 See Rhee, supra note 13, at 1446–50. R
273 See id. at 1450–56.
274 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 2.02(b)(4) (2011) (adopting a similar exculpation provision).  The legislature
enacted this section in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom. See Emerald Partners v. Ber-
lin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del.
2001).  Most Delaware public corporations have passed charter amendments incorpo-
rating an exculpation clause under section 102(b)(7). See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv-
ative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 752 (Del. Ch. 2005); Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance
in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160–61 (1990).
275 See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as
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Contractarian scholars have touted section 102(b)(7) as a clear exam-
ple of corporation law’s grounding in contracts.276  Yet, this con-
tractarian explanation does not pass muster upon a closer
examination from the perspective of tort law.
Section 102(b)(7) is in the nature of an affirmative defense.277  It
is a waiver of liability and assumption of risk by the corporation for
acts that would otherwise be a breach of the duty of care.  Courts have
recognized that in the course of commercial transactions, parties can
contract for varying levels of care in the tort realm.278  The validity of
such waivers of liability depends on the legitimacy of the actual bar-
gaining with an attention to coercion, adhesion, and asymmetric bar-
gaining.  Importantly, even when there has been actual bargaining
and an informed waiver, courts invalidate contracts based on impor-
tant public policy concerns.279  Under tort law, the freedom to con-
tract is constrained by public policy.280
Section 102(b)(7) is best understood as a waiver of liability under
a tort framework.  It allows the exculpation of a director’s personal
liability for money damages, but there are important public policy
prohibitions that limit freedom of contract.  The violation of a duty of
care can still result in equitable relief281 such as injunction and rescis-
Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Per-
spective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1271–72 (1999); Rock, supra note 82, at 1012. But R
see Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 1791 n.150 (rejecting characterization that section R
102(b)(7) permits opting out of duty of care “because the provision does not excuse
directors from using care—it merely relieves them of personal liability for damages
for failing to do so”).
276 “Arguably, the most important change created by Van Gorkom is the duty of
care opt-out provision of section 102(b)(7) and the demonstration that such a con-
tractarian approach to corporate governance is workable.”  Henry N. Butler, Smith v.
Van Gorkom, Jurisdictional Competition, and the Role of Random Mutations in the Evolution
of Corporate Law, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 281–82 (2006); see also Arthur B. Laby, The
Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 125 (2008) (noting that
contractarian scholars point to section 102(b)(7) as a prime example of the theory of
corporate contract).
277 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223–24 (Del. 1999).
278 See generally, e.g., Anderson v. Erie R.R. Co., 119 N.E. 557 (N.Y. 1918) (finding
no liability upon express waiver given in consideration for reduced fare); Manning v.
Brannon, 956 P.2d 156 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997) (finding no liability for express waiver
based upon arms-length transaction).
279 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 313–51 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the
principle).
280 See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 441–42 (Cal. 1963)
(“[A]n agreement between a hospital and an entering patient affects the public inter-
est and . . . the exculpatory provision included within it must be invalid under [Cali-
fornia Civil Code].”).
281 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 260–61. R
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sion.  Importantly, the exculpation provision does not extend to
breach of loyalty, bad faith, intentional misconduct, or self-interested
transactions.282  Such broad waivers would clearly violate public pol-
icy.283  Thus, even if a corporation and its board properly follow the
procedures set forth in corporation law and institute a complete elimi-
nation of fiduciary duty in the absence of a legislative mandate, such
an act would be void as a matter of public policy.
The exculpation provision of corporation law is as much an illus-
tration of the limits of the purely contractual view of corporate govern-
ance.  This is made clear when we compare Section 102(b)(7) with its
counterpart in the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act
(DLLCA).  Section 1101 of the DLLCA permits fiduciary duty to be
“eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company agreement;
provided, that the limited liability company agreement may not elimi-
nate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.”284  Compare, then, Section 1101 with Section 102(b)(7), which
provides that the corporate charter cannot eliminate the duty of loy-
alty, the obligation to act in good faith, the obligation to refrain from
intentional misconduct or knowing violation of the law, liability for
unlawful stock purchase or payment of dividends, and liability for
transactions from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit.285  The policy of the DLLCA is “to give the maximum effect to
the principle of freedom of contract,”286 but the same cannot be said
for the DGCL as to fiduciary waivers.
It is fair to say that exculpation provisions of corporation law
would never go so far as to allow elimination of fiduciary duties.
While members of an LLC may well be served by a near complete
freedom of contract as to fiduciary duty, even diehard contractarian
scholars would probably have qualms about permitting the elimina-
tion of fiduciary duty in corporation law.  Unlike the actual con-
282 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 2.02(b)(4) (2011).
283 Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 116 (“[T]he business judgment rule has never R
protected directors who commit fraud or self-dealing.”).
284 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (emphasis added).  The “contractual”
emphasis makes clear that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must relate to a
specific, bargained for contractual term in the operating agreement, as opposed to a
more amorphous, judicially malleable concept of good faith.
285 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
286 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1101(b).  Delaware is not alone in permitting the elim-
ination of fiduciary duty.  A substantial number of states also permit contractual elimi-
nation. See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 524–25 (2d ed. 2011) (listing eighteen states as permit-
ting full power to waive fiduciary duty).
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tracting that takes place among members in an LLC,287 which
operates very much like a partnership, the “nexus of contracts” is a
metaphor in corporation law first used by economists to describe a
bundle of economic rights among corporate constituents.288  “Con-
tracting” occurs on various levels of abstraction.289  More importantly,
the public interest in the proper working of the modern public corpo-
ration is many orders more significant than the interest in smaller bus-
iness entities, and as such corporation law is substantially tinged with
considerations of public policy.  Courts and legislatures are well aware
of this fact.  There is no doubt that the permissible elimination of
fiduciary duty, something that would be in the best self-interest of
directors and officers, would be disastrous for corporate enter-
prises.290  Seen as a waiver of liability for a breach of duty, Section
102(b)(7) is a clear example of the tort foundation of corporation
law.
As the above discussion shows, it is clear that tort principles are
seen in various corners of corporate law.  And, as explained in Part II,
the application of tort principles and theories explains the nature of
the fiduciary duty of care and the business judgment rule.  However,
the distinction between torts and contracts is not so clear.  Some tort
problems can be viewed as hypothetical contract problems,291 and a
contract analysis of the terms and conditions is dispositive with respect
to allocating liability among market participants.  This raises the ques-
tion: Is there a meaningful analytical significance between the prevail-
ing contractarian view of corporate law and a corrected tort analogy,
or is the issue simply academic?  In most cases, regardless of whether
the standard of care is said to derive ultimately from contracts or torts,
the end is the same.  We reach the same Coasean result achieved by
respecting the bargain that would have been struck but for the imped-
iment of transaction costs and, in the case of corporate law, the
impractical reality that the corporate entity cannot bargain for
287 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 165, at 37 (suggesting that LLCs “have real contracts” R
unlike corporations).
288 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 121, at 310. See generally Coase, supra note R
228. R
289 See RIBSTEIN, supra note 165, at 37–38 (suggesting that “contracting” in the R
corporation is only “hypothetical”).
290 For a discussion of the collapse of Enron and how it was attributable to the
board’s failure to monitor the corporation and a poisonous web of conflict of interest
among its executives and professional advisers, see generally SALTER, supra note 203 R
(describing the origin and legacy of Enron’s collapse).
291 Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 1993); see
also supra note 122. R
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itself.292  However, the distinction matters because a tort perspective
provides greater leeway in considering the normative implications of
fiduciary duty and board liability.
The difference in perspectives can result in a narrow band of
cases where a tort analysis can yield more flexible and better results
when societal wealth is the maximand.293  An interesting case illustrat-
ing the point arose during the financial crisis of 2007–2009.  On the
same day that Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September
2008, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch announced their merger.294
Much has been written about this merger in the popular press and in
the academic literature, and a detailed recitation of the facts is unnec-
essary.295  The salient facts for the purpose here are these:  In the
midst of the financial crisis, Bank of America agreed to acquire Merrill
Lynch.296  The board approved the deal knowing that Bank of
America had conducted due diligence on Merrill Lynch for only
about 30 hours.297  Merrill Lynch was a multi-billion dollar firm and
one of three largest independent investment banks at the time.298
Suffice to say that its businesses operations, including its trading activi-
ties, were incredibly complicated, made exponentially more compli-
cated by an ongoing global financial crisis including the concurrent
demise of Lehman Brothers.  Considering only Bank of America’s
decisionmaking, the procedure surrounding the acquisition was
clearly flawed and grossly negligent.299  The argument that the board
satisfied its duty of care when it approved the merger defies
credibility.300
292 See Coase, supra note 228. R
293 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 37 (arguing societal wealth is the R
maximand).
294 See Rhee, supra note 250, at 664–96 (describing the events of the merger). R
295 See generally id.; GREG FARRELL, CRASH OF THE TITANS (2010).
296 Rhee, supra note 250, at 665. R
297 Id. at 678–79.
298 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES,
Sep. 15, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15
lehman.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
299 Rhee, supra note 250, at 678. R
300 “To suggest that the Bank fully assessed Merrill within a matter of a few hours
during extraordinary circumstances is a bridge too far.” Id. at 682. Subsequently,
Bank of America settled federal securities class action based on improper disclosure
surrounding the Merrill Lynch acquisition for $2.43 billion. Jessica Silver-Greenberg
& Susanne Craig, Bank of America Settles Suit Over Merrill for $2.43 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Sep. 28, 2012, at A1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/bank-of-
america-to-pay-2-43-billion-to-settle-class-action-over-merrill-deal/.
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Despite the clear violation of the fiduciary duty of care, the Mer-
rill Lynch acquisition raises an interesting hypothetical: Suppose the
board approved the deal and rescued Merrill Lynch, despite the clear
procedural flaws in due diligence, because the board felt compelled to
assist the government and the public during an extraordinary public
crisis by rescuing a financially troubled Merrill Lynch at the cost of
financial harm to Bank of America.  In this case, absent statutory
authority or mandate,301 a contractarian analysis would rely on the
principal-agent contract, under which an agent clearly cannot inten-
tionally harm the principal; here, corporate value would be preserved
while societal wealth would diminish in a far greater sum.  On the
other hand, a tort-based analysis may yield a different wealth maximiz-
ing outcome.  Under tort principles, intentional harm that would
ordinarily be a breach of duty may be excused when public necessity
mandates the result.302  Whereas under a contractarian analysis there
would be breach of duty and the imposition of liability, under a flexi-
ble tort analysis certain conduct that would otherwise be a breach of
duty may be given a safe harbor when social wealth is the maximand
and the board’s action advanced that goal.
Therefore, while in most cases, the analytical frameworks of torts
or contracts produce the same results, there are cases where the
framework matters.  Differences in normative value judgments, if per-
mitted to be expressed, may yield this divergence.
B. Doctrinal Development and the Central Role of Courts
An orientation of the duty of care and the business judgment rule
as rules of duty—and taking the concept of duty seriously as a theoret-
ical matter—leads to an important implication.  Duty and its scope are
legal questions requiring an inquiring court.303  This fundamental
point has been challenged and it requires analysis.
301 In fact, there is statutory authority for boards to provide public assistance to
the government. Id. at 704–09 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(12) (2009) and
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(14) (2003)).  “[S]ection 122(12) empowers a corpora-
tion ‘to transact any lawful business which the corporation’s board of directors shall
find to be in aid of governmental authority.’” Id. at 704 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 122(12)).
302 See id. at 707–15 (discussing necessity and proposing a fiduciary exemption
during a public crisis).
303 “The formulation of the duty of loyalty and duty of care involves questions of
law which are, of course, subject to de novo review by this Court.”  Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 328B (1965) (“[T]he court determines . . . whether such facts give risk to any
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Most notably, Stephen Bainbridge has argued that the business
judgment rule is an abstention doctrine, and not a standard of liability
requiring a substantive judicial review of board decisions.304  The
abstention theory of the business judgment rule is highly dependent
upon an acceptance of Bainbridge’s theory of director primacy, which
states that the central problem in corporation law is the tension
between authority and accountability.305  Authority and accountability
are antithetical because the power to hold to account is ultimately the
power to decide.306  The business judgment rule is the principal
mechanism by which corporation law resolves that tension.307  The
business judgment rule is a judicial abstention doctrine, and it “thus
builds a prophylactic barrier by which courts pre-commit to resisting
the temptation to review the merits of the board’s decision.”308  Judi-
cial review should be the exception rather than the rule.  This con-
templates judicial reticence, but leaves open the possibility of judicial
intervention in an appropriate, limited set of circumstances.  “If the
business judgment rule is treated as a standard of liability, rather than
as an abstention doctrine, judicial intervention readily could become
the norm rather than the exception.”309  Framed in this way, Bain-
bridge suggests that the business judgment rule is a normative limita-
tion on the exercise of the court’s authority.
The abstention theory is problematic in several ways.  First, if we
are to construe the reference to an abstention doctrine strictly rather
than as a rhetoric device, none of the traditional abstention doctrines
in matters of jurisdiction and judicial comity, the doctrinal space
where abstention is seen in actual practice, apply to the issues in cor-
legal duty on the part of the defendant [and] the standard of conduct required of the
defendant by his legal duty . . . .”).
304 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 87–88; accord Johnson, Modest, supra note 4, at 631 R
(“Properly understood, the business judgment rule is simply a policy of judicial non-
review.”).
305 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 86.  For a more thorough development of the idea R
of the tension between authority and accountability, see generally Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV.
791, 807 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corpo-
rate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003).  Others have expressed similar
views on board authority and accountability. See Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman
Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI
Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 522 (1989) (“The power to hold to account is
the power to interfere and, ultimately, the power to decide.”).
306 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 103. R
307 Id. at 87.
308 Id. at 128.
309 Id. at 127.
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poration law.310  Second, abnegation of judicial authority conflicts
with the essential role of courts in defining duty and determining lia-
bility.  The business judgment rule cannot be an abnegation of power
because its very existence arises from the exercise of judicial lawmak-
ing.311  The court’s power to give deference must also mean the
court’s power to take it.312
Bainbridge does not go so far as to suggest that courts lack the
power to opine on questions of business decisions.  He properly
acknowledges that the theory is not one of jurisdiction—ultimately it
is the court’s decision to “pre-commit” to not review the substance of a
board’s decision.313  But he suggests that the purpose of the business
judgment rule “is to prevent courts from even asking the question: did
the board breach its duty of care?”314  From a tort perspective, this is a
non sequitur.  It is axiomatic that duty is a question of law decided by
courts.315  If there is a common law-based imposition of duty, as there
is in the Delaware scheme of fiduciary duty, the court must determine
questions of duty and breach.  The abstention theory is irreconcilably
in tension with the fundamental principle that courts decide ques-
tions of duty and once a duty exists there must be a process to deter-
mine whether it has been breached (otherwise we would have an
incoherent oxymoron in a form of a legal duty without enforceable
obligation).
The business judgment rule does not accomplish protection of
board decisions through judicial abnegation.  Rather, the systematic
outcomes of no liability are achieved because the business judgment
rule reflects a reasoned judgment of courts on the nature of a wrong;
they evince the exercise of judicial power, and not the relinquishment
of it.  As a statement on duty, the question of board liability is first a
question of law, thus largely insulating disinterested directors from a
310 See Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability in
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 75–80 (2008).  Scarlett argues
that the qualified immunity provides a better model for the business judgment rule.
Id. at 85–90.  Broadly, immunity is a defense against torts. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 131–135 (5th ed. 1984).
311 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. R
312 The court’s deference is only that under the business judgment rule it will not
“unreasonably” impose itself into the business and affairs of the corporation.  Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
313 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 128. R
314 Id. at 95.
315 See generally, e.g., Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 562 N.E.2d 967 (Ill. 1990) (hold-
ing that a finding of no duty by the court is permissible at motion to dismiss stage);
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (finding, as a matter of law,
that no duty existed).
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factfinder’s judgment.316  As a legal question, however, duty is a malle-
able concept subject to the court’s power to determine its existence
and scope: courts can stretch it, contract it, or shape it as common law
courts are prone to do with changing social, economic, and political
circumstances resulting in incremental differences in normative value
judgments over time.317  Common law courts, and particularly Dela-
ware courts, sitting in corporation law are not oblivious to these facts
of judicial authority and the common law process.318
An example of how an inquiring court shapes the concept of duty
and defines wrongs is the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.319  There, an independent special litigation
committee exercising its business judgment moved to dismiss a prop-
erly filed shareholder derivative suit.320  The court rejected the use of
the business judgment rule to the independent committee’s decision,
which would preclude judicial review of the decision.321  It deter-
mined that the “risk in the realities of [the] situation,” such as sympa-
thy for fellow directors, justified “caution beyond adherence to the
theory of business judgment.”322  The substantive business decision
was not beyond the jurisdiction or the ken of the court, which can
competently opine on the nature of fiduciary relationships and
duties.323  Accordingly, in determining whether to dismiss the case
pursuant to the motion of the special litigation committee, the court
adopted a two-part standard: First, “the [c]ourt should inquire into
the independence and good faith of the committee;” second, “the
[c]ourt should determine, applying its own independent business judg-
ment, whether the motion should be granted.”324 Zapata is not fol-
316 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 256. R
317 See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953) (“These
are shifting sands, and no fit foundation.  There is a duty if the court says there is a
duty . . . .”).
318 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corpo-
rate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1610 (2005) (“Delaware corporate law may be the last
vestige of the 19th century common law style in America.”); E. Norman Veasey &
Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance
from 1992–2004?  A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411
(2005) (“Delaware’s common law process, which places case law at the forefront of
corporate law, is the functional equivalent of judicial legislation.”).
319 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
320 Id. at 781.
321 Id. at 787.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 788.
324 Id. at 788–89 (emphasis added).
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lowed in other jurisdictions.325  Whether one agrees or not with the
merit of the Delaware approach on this particular issue, the case
shows how courts can and do shape the questions of duty and scope of
duty.  As the court concludes, “[u]nder our system of law, courts and
not litigants should decide the merits of litigation.”326
Another example of how the judicial process shapes the law of
duty and breach is Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.  There, the trial court
per Chancellor Allen found a breach of the duty of care, but relying
on Barnes v. Andrews327 he ruled for the defendant on the ground that
the plaintiff could not prove causation and injury.328  The trial court
rolled the concepts of duty, breach of duty, causation, and injury into
the business judgment rule, requiring the plaintiff to show gross negli-
gence, causation, and injury to overturn the presumption of the busi-
ness judgment rule.329  The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this
expansion of the business judgment rule.330  Properly characterizing
Barnes as a tort case,331 the court opined that the “tort principles of
Barnes have no place in a business judgment rule standard of review
analysis.”332
Contrary to the seemingly blanket rejection of tort principles, the
Cede court’s ruling is on sound tort footing.  The tort principle in
Barnes was causation.  It is a basic principle that questions of duty,
325 See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 (N.Y. 1979) (ruling that the sub-
stantive decision to dismiss the case is subject to the business judgment rule); see also
Atkins v. Topp Comm, Inc., 874 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“The plain
language of [the Florida statute] does not require Zapata’s second-step analysis.”);
Boland v. Boland, 31 A.3d 529, 538 (Md. 2011) (“[W]e shall adhere to the business
judgment rule as applied in Auerbach . . . .”); In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. Share-
holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 559 (Minn. 2008) (“Finding nothing in
either our statutes or case law that compels the level of scrutiny contemplated in
Zapata, and concluding that the reasoning of Auerbach is more persuasive, we adopt a
test modeled on the Auerbach standard.”); REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COM-
PANY ACT § 905(e) (following the Auerbach approach for LLC’s).
326 Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789 n.18 (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251,
1263 (Del. Ch. 1980)).
327 Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); see supra Part II.A.
328 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 551, 561, 572–73 (Del.
Ch. 1991).
329 Id. at 572.  “Under the conventional (business judgment) approach . . . [a]
plaintiff must show that director gross negligence is involved and must show as well
that the stockholders were injured by that negligence.” Id. (citing Barnes, 298 F.).
330 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 370 (Del. 1993).
331 Id. at 370 (“Barnes [is] a tort action . . . .”); see also Barnes, 298 F. at 616 (“This
cause of action rests upon a tort, as much though it be a tort of omission as though it
had rested upon a positive act.”).
332 Cede, 634 A.2d at 370 (“Barnes, a tort action, does not control a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.”).
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breach, causation, and injuries are separate inquiries.333  This idea was
famously memorialized in the debate between Cardozo and Andrews
in Palsgraf.334  The business judgment rule defines the standard of
care, i.e., the meaning of negligence, and with its presumption it
places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove a wrong.  In Cede,
the plaintiff did so and thus overturned the rule’s presumption.335
That being the case, Cede rejected the trial court’s attempt to encom-
pass the concepts of duty, breach, causation, and injury in a single
rule of law, which would have inordinately placed doctrinal stress on
the rule itself.336
The inquiries of causation and injury have no place in an inquiry
concerning duty and standard of care.  Once a breach of fiduciary
duty is shown, the defendant has the burden to prove entire fair-
ness.337  Ordinarily, the plaintiff must also prove causation and injury.
However, to the student of tort law, burden shifting to the defendant
to prove elements of the prima facie cause of action, such as causation
and injury, is hardly foreign.  Courts sitting in tort law have presumed
negligence in the absence of direct evidence and have shifted the bur-
den of showing non-negligence to the defendant;338 they have shifted
the burden of identifying the culpable defendant to a group of
defendants;339 they have shifted the burden of proof on causation to
the defendant;340 and they have even eliminated the traditional causa-
tion inquiry from the plaintiff’s case altogether.341  Such is the innova-
tions of common law courts in solving thorny social problems.
In Cede, we see the innovation of the common law process at work
in the field of corporate law.  Shifting the burden of showing causa-
tion and injury to the defendant under the entire fairness standard is
333 See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920) (“We must be on our
guard, however, against confusing the question of negligence with that of the causal
connection between the negligence and the injury.”).
334 Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–100 (N.Y. 1928), with
id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
335 Cede, 634 A.2d at 351 (“[W]e find the business judgment presumption . . . to
have been rebutted for board lack of due care.”).
336 Id. at 350 (“We . . . conclude that the trial court . . . erred . . . in reformulating
the business judgment rule’s elements . . . .”).
337 Id. at 371.
338 See generally Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch.) (invoking the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).
339 See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (en banc); Ybarra v. Spangard,
154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944).
340 See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936–37 (Cal. 1980); Haft v. Lone
Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 470 (Cal. 1970) (en banc).
341 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072–73 (N.Y. 1989).
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consistent with tort principles, even for a breach of the duty of care.342
Unlike most tort accidents, causation and loss in business transactions
may be difficult to prove because of the abstract nature of economic
injuries, and the task is made more difficult due to the information
asymmetry between plaintiff and defendant.343  Once the difficult task
of showing a wrong has been accomplished under the exacting sub-
stantive and procedural standards of corporation law, burden shifting
on the issue of causation and injury, as well as a more robust judicial
inquiry, makes sense in light of the proven wrong, the difficulties of
proof on causation and injury, and the pervasive information asymme-
try.  Thus, Cede is a good example of how courts sitting in corporation
law develop flexible doctrines requiring a balance between manage-
ment authority and judicial inquiry.
Ultimately, courts are the arbiters of what is and is not a legal
wrong in fiduciary relationships, and the duty of care and the business
judgment rule must be construed as a “judicial creature” subject to
the evolution in the common law process.344
CONCLUSION
A flawed tort analogy has been a major reason for the confusion
over the relationship between the duty of care and the business judg-
ment rule. The laws of torts and corporation converge.  The founda-
tional principles governing the duty of care and the business
judgment rule rests on a tort foundation.  Under a corrected tort anal-
ogy, the duty of care is a misnomer to the extent that it suggests liabil-
ity for economic loss caused by errors in judgment.  Corporation law is
correct to preclude substantive review of good or bad risk taking and
the outcomes there from because the scope of the duty does not
extend that far when we consider the nature of a director’s affirmative
obligation and economic analyses of lost profit.  Contractarian expla-
342 But see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 289 (arguing that the entire fairness stan- R
dard should not apply to a breach of care case); Allen et al., Realigning the Standard,
supra note 4, at 461–62 (same). R
343 See Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 120 (Del. 2006)
(“[S]tockholders [can] use the ‘tools at hand’ to obtain the necessary information
before filing a derivative action.” (quoting Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216
(Del. 1996))); Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1056 (Del. 2004) (“In general, deriva-
tive plaintiffs are not entitled to discovery in order to demonstrate demand futility.”);
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1974) (giving stockholders the right to
inspect a company’s records).
344 “The judicial articulation of fiduciary duty law in Delaware is constantly evolv-
ing and has developed over about eight or nine decades.  It is the quintessential appli-
cation of the common law process.”  Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 318, at 1413. R
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nations and tort principles converge in a coherent view of fiduciary
obligations and the court’s role in stating and enforcing them.  The
duty of care is really an affirmative duty to the care for the corporation
inherent in the statutory grant of authority to the board.  That duty
means that the board must affirmatively make decisions in good faith,
do so advisedly, and must not abdicate its function.  Not surprisingly,
such failures are not covered by the business judgment rule and direc-
tors are exposed to liability.  Thus, the meaning of negligence derives
from the substance given to the director’s duty by the participants of
the corporate enterprise.
The thesis of this Article also has a larger implication.  If the tort
analogy is robust, the contractarian view of corporation law is con-
strained by the tort foundation of corporation law.  Whereas the con-
tractarian analysis emphasizes freedom of contract and diminishes the
role of courts to custodians of the corporate contract and legislative
mandates, a tort framework argues that courts do and should play a
robust, albeit reserved, role in regulating important aspects of corpo-
rate governance through continued doctrinal development of the
idea of a wrong.  A tort framework better accommodates the incorpo-
ration and recognition of normative value judgments in judicial deci-
sionmaking.  The implication of this view extends to the various
corners of corporation law, including among other issues, limited lia-
bility, fiduciary duty, public rescue, executive compensation, and take-
over defenses.
